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Hume, Kant and Mill each approach morality with distinctly different frameworks 
and methodologies, but it is important to acknowledge that they all share the crucial 
thought that morality involves an impartial point of view.  Hume and Kant both recognize 
that morality is universal: what is right for one must be right for all.  They both use this 
recognition as the starting point for their investigations.  Furthermore, we can interpret 
Mill’s proof so that it moves from a first-personal point of view to an impartial point of 
view.  By addressing the most serious objections to the role of universality in each of 
these philosophical systems, I make room for acknowledging the shared ground from 
which each of these philosophers begin their investigations. 
Critics of Hume have worried that emphasizing the general point of view in his 
system will lead to conflicts with those passages in which he denies the role of reason in 
morality.  I argue that these conflicts can be resolved by attending to a distinction 
between moral reactions and moral judgments.   
Critics of Kant object to his argument that the universal law formulation is a 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that this general point of view 
does not accurately pick out worthy maxims.  I argue that Kant does not expect the 
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general point of view, as expressed in FUL, alone to do this.  Instead, we must also rely 
on a universal end—humanity—and this insight is expressed in the humanity 
formulation.   
Critics of Mill have objected to his proof by objecting to two central premises:  
that what is desired is desirable, and that if each person’s happiness is desirable, the 
aggregate happiness is desirable.  I argue that it is essential to Mill’s proof that the former 
is said from the first-person point of view, whereas the latter is said from the moral 
(general) point of view.  The former premise means that the fact that I desire something is 
evidence to me that it is desirable for me.  When we move through the argument to the 
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Hume, Kant and Mill each approach morality with distinctly different frameworks 
and methodologies, but it is important to acknowledge that they all share the crucial 
thought that morality involves an impartial point of view.  Of course, to say that morality 
involves an impartial point of view is to say something very vague—and the way in 
which morality involves an impartial point of view will be importantly different for all 
three thinkers.  Hume and Kant both recognize that morality is universal, that it applies to 
all of us1, and so what is right for one of us must be right for all of us.  Hume and Kant 
both use this recognition as the starting point for their investigation, and we will turn in a 
moment to discuss the relationship for each between an impartial point of view and 
universality.  For Mill, this recognition plays a more subtle role, but I will argue that we 
can rescue the proof of utilitarianism in Chapter 4 from the traditional objections with an 
interpretation according to which Mill moves with us from a first-personal point of view 
to a general or impartial point of view.   
 As I am using the term, an impartial point of view differs from a first-person point 
of view in that the unique concerns and commitments inherent in a first-person point of 
view are not as forceful when considered from the impartial point of view.  From my own 
point of view, i.e. from my “first-person” point of view, I have a set of interests, goals, 
                                                 
1For Hume, “all of us” means all humans, whereas for Kant, it means all rational beings (which presumably 
includes most humans).    
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commitments, feelings, etc., that is unique to me, and not shared by others.2  When I 
make a decision, I will tend to put that set of concerns and commitments front and center.  
They will be the most important considerations in my decision-making process.  From an 
impartial point of view, however, I must take this set of concerns and commitments and 
“put it in perspective”—i.e., recognize that it is merely one set among many sets of 
concerns and commitments.  This is my set of concerns and commitments, but others 
have such sets as well. The impersonal point of view is one from which all of these sets 
are viewed from the outside, so to speak. From this perspective, the grip that my concerns 
and commitments have on me as their subject is loosened, and I am able to weigh the 
concerns and commitments of others more impartially. On one plausible line, taking up 
this kind of impartial point of view is precisely how it is that universality is introduced 
into moral thinking as well. The impartial point of view will be a universal point of 
view—that is, it is a point of view that arguably will be the same for all of us.  There will 
be contingencies and differences in how each philosopher makes this connection, though, 
so let us now take a closer look at the impartial point of view in each moral theory. 
 Hume is appropriately sensitive to the universality issue, as can be seen in the 
Treatise, where he addresses an objection to his attempt to ground morality in sympathy.  
According to the objection, an account that takes sympathy as its central concept will be 
too variable and insufficiently universal to represent what we expect from an account of 
morality. Hume acknowledges the concern, agreeing that morality requires universality.   
He attempts to appease the objector by introducing a general point of view.  The 
modification is an attempt to capture both sentiment (sympathy) and universality on his 
                                                 
2Of course, some of my concerns and commitments may be shared by some other people.  It may even be 
conceivable that there would be two people who shared exactly the same concerns and commitments.  The 
important point, though, is that there are differences in interests between agents.  Some people care about 
some things, and other people care about other different things. 
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view.  When we adopt the general point of view, he claims, we ignore the differences that 
distance and time can make to our non-moral reactions.  From the general point of view, 
it does not matter how close to or far from someone we are.  We adopt a point of view 
where we ignore the features particular to us, in our particular circumstances.   
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our 
situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam’d or 
prais’d, and according to the present disposition of our mind.  But these 
variations we regard not, in our general decisions, but still apply the terms 
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain’d 
in one point of view.   
Hume’s view, then, is that moral reactions are reactions felt from the general point of 
view, and moral evaluations are evaluations that only draw on moral reactions (both our 
own and those of others).  True moral judgments will not rely on non-moral reactions as 
evidence—i.e. true moral judgments will only rely for evidence on reactions that are had 
from the general point of view.  We will see that there are complications, but the essential 
point here is to observe the centrality of a general point of view in Hume’s moral system. 
 Critics have worried that an interpretation which emphasizes the general point of 
view in Hume’s system will lead to conflicts with passages in which he denies the role of 
reason in morality.  I will argue that these conflicts can be resolved by attending to a 
distinction between moral reactions and moral judgments.  Reason has a proper place in 
moral judgment, but it does not play a role in determining virtue and vice, which are 
instead determined by the reactions we have from the moral point of view (hypothetical 
or actual).  This distinction allows us to respect the importance of the general point of 
view in Hume’s ethics while resolving any worries about purported conflicting passages. 
Kant is less explicit regarding the general point of view, but he is explicit about 
universality.  Kant thinks that the content in the first formulation, the universal law 
formulation, is derived from the very concept of a categorical imperative, from the very 
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concept of a moral law, and this concept essentially involves universality.  The 
categorical imperative is a universal law, and as such it applies to all of us.  Kant writes, 
But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know right away what it 
contains.  For since this imperative contains, besides the law, only the 
necessity that the maxim conform to this law, while the law, as we have 
seen, contains no condition limiting it, there is nothing left over to which 
the maxim of action should conform except the universality of a law as 
such; and it is only this conformity that the imperative asserts to be 
necessary (4:222). 
 
If the categorical imperative applies to all of us, then we must only act in accordance with 
maxims that can be willed to be universal law (because if the maxim cannot be willed to 
be universal law, then it does not apply to all of us and therefore cannot be a principle of 
morality).  But this is the universal law formulation:  ‘Act only on that maxim by which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (4:222). 
So far, then, we have seen that the very concept of a categorical imperative is the 
concept of a universal law.  But I also think that the universal law formulation is Kant’s 
way of capturing the general point of view.  We test our maxims by making sure that they 
could be willed to be universal law—that is, by making sure that they can apply to 
everyone, and not just us.  But this test involves adopting a general point of view, in a 
way.  It involves ignoring my own aims, inclinations, and desires, and instead evaluating 
the maxim of my action from a general perspective.  Worthy maxims will be those that I 
choose, not from my own perspective (keeping in mind my own goals and inclinations), 
but from a more general perspective, one that involves evaluating them for adoption 
universally.   
Critics object to Kant by claiming that this general point of view does not 
accurately pick out all and only worthy maxims.  I will argue that Kant does not expect 
the general point of view, as expressed in the universal law formulation, alone to do this.  
Instead, we must also rely on a universal end—humanity—and this insight is expressed in 
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the humanity formulation.  As always, there will be complications, but again, the 
important thing is to recognize that for Kant as for Hume, the general point of view (the 
universal law formulation) is a way of capturing universality, which is essential for any 
proper system of morals. 
It is far less clear that Mill’s starting point is the same as that of Hume and Kant, 
the universality of morality and the importance of the general point of view. However, I 
will argue that a charitable interpretation of his proof is one that pays careful attention to 
the transition from the first-person point of view into the general point of view that his 
conclusion requires.  We will see that the relevant part of his proof can be reconstructed 
as follows:   
P1.  What is desired is desirable.  (Or, a desire for X is evidence that X is 
desirable.)   
P2.  Happiness is desired.   
P3.  Happiness is desirable (or at least, we have evidence that happiness is 
desirable, from P1 and P2). 
P4.  Since each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is 
desirable. 
Mill begins his proof with the claim that the fact that something (in this case, happiness, 
but the principle is broad enough to apply to anything) is desired is evidence that it is 
desirable—P1.  Later, in P4, he goes on to move from the fact that individual happiness is 
desirable (to the individual) to the fact that the aggregate happiness is desirable (to the 
aggregate).  Critics have tended to object to P1 on the grounds that the fact that I desire 
something is no evidence that it is desirable (and they understand desirable as being 
worthy of desire very generally).  Critics have further tended to object to P4 on the 
grounds that I have no reason to pursue something that is desirable to the aggregate.   
I will argue that it is essential to Mill’s proof that P1 is said from the first-person 
point of view, whereas P4 is said from the moral (general) point of view.  When Mill 
claims that the fact that I desire x implies that x is desirable, the implication is claimed 
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from the first-person point of view.  That I desire something is evidence to me that it is 
desirable for me.  But when we move through the argument to P4, we move to a more 
general, moral point of view.  The move from my happiness being good to me to the 
aggregate happiness being a good to the aggregate is legitimated by taking up a general, 
moral point of view.  I will argue that interpreting P4 from the general, moral point of 
view will gain traction when we recognize that since Mill addressed moral motivation in 
chapter 3, this proof is more plausibly interpreted as addressing the question of what 
makes something moral at all, and not as addressing the question of why I should be 
moral. As I will show in my paper, we should instead understand P4 as a claim about 
what is desirable from the moral point of view. 
 
 
Hume and the General Point of View 
Some commentators on Hume have found it difficult to reconcile his introduction 
of the “general point of view” with the rest of his moral theory.  In particular, there seems 
to be a tension between his frequent proclamations against any role of reason in morality, 
on the one hand, and what appears to be the required place of reason in the general point 
of view, on the other.  If it is true that “in order…to arrive at a more stable judgment of 
things, we fix on some steady and general points of view;  and always, in our thoughts, 
place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation” (371-2)3, then, 
commentators have argued, the view implies that we must exercise our faculty of reason 
in order to evaluate certain moral situations.  Since the general point of view is explicitly 
a point of view different than our own, these commentators argue that we must use our 
faculty of reason to figure out what we would feel if we had actually adopted that point of 
view.  However, if we must exercise our faculty of reason in order to adopt the general 
point of view, then it becomes difficult to make sense of Hume’s proclamations against 
the role of reason in moral evaluation.  To put it another way, some passages in Hume 
(namely, the passages in which he argues that we adopt a general point of view when 
making moral judgments) appear to be incompatible with what is standardly taken to be 
the “Humean” position, i.e. a form of antirationalism or noncognitivism in which there is 
no role for reason in moral evaluation.  
                                                 
3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton.  Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
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I argue that making a distinction between primary moral reactions (which are not 
the result of reasoning) and secondary moral evaluations/judgments (which can be the 
result of reasoning) will resolve this prime facie tension in Hume’s moral system.  On 
this interpretation, our faculty of reason has no role in our primary moral reactions.  
However, we do use our faculty of reason when we make secondary moral 
evaluations/judgments.  I also argue that, for Hume, we first adopt the general point of 
view, and we then feel sentiments from that point of view.  While we can, in theory, 
deduce what someone in the general point of view would feel by employing our faculty 
of reason, we can also actually adopt this point of view, and thereby feel the sentiments, 
instead of using our faculty of reason to deduce these sentiments.  Ultimately, I argue that 
Hume is not an antirationalist or noncognitivist, even though on his view morality is not 
constituted by reason.  Recognizing a distinction in his theory between moral reactions 
and moral judgments is what makes it possible to understand Hume in this way.  
In the first section of this paper, I lay out my interpretation of the role of the 
general point of view, paying particular attention to how we should understand it in the 
context of Hume’s overall moral theory.  On this subject, we will consider first the 
Treatise, and then the Enquiry.  In the second section, I defend my interpretation of the 
general point of view against an objection given by Cohon.4  I will also consider one of 
Hume’s central arguments, which I will argue supports my interpretation of the general 
point of view against Cohon’s objection.  In the third section, I extend this defense to 
Hume’s claims about the motivational aspect of morality.   
                                                 
4Rachel Cohon, “The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, v57:4, pp.827-850. 
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Section 1: The general point of view 
 Before we discuss why Hume introduces the general point of view, let us first 
take some time to understand the mechanism of sympathy.  A deeper understanding of its 
mechanism will aid us well, given the role that sympathy plays in his moral system.  The 
mechanism works as follows:  We see another person, who feels some sentiment.  We are 
aware of what sentiment the creature feels from outward signs (things he says, faces he 
makes), and therefore have an idea of the sentiment he feels.   
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is as first known only by its 
effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, 
which convey an idea of it (206).  
 
For example, suppose that you see a friend who has tears streaming down his face, 
shoulders slumped, etc.  You then have an idea of sadness.  The impression of his face 
causes you to have an idea of sadness, via the association of resembling ideas—his face 
resembles other faces when they are sad, which brings to mind the idea of sadness.   
Then, we feel an impression of that very same sentiment.  To continue the 
example, you yourself would feel sadness.  The idea you have of your friend’s sadness 
causes you to feel sadness, to have an impression of sadness.  Then, the impression of 
that sentiment serves to enliven the idea we felt of his sentiment.   
This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a 
degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and 
produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (206).   
 
Your impression of your own sadness causes your idea of your friend’s sadness to 
become enlivened, and hence to become an impression itself.  Hume writes, on the 
phenomenon of enlivening ideas so that they become impressions, 
It has been remark’d in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are 
borrow’d from impressions, and that these two kinds of perceptions differ 
10 
  
only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the 
soul….The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the 
only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be 
remov’d, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and 
ideas, ‘tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means 
be so enliven’d as to become the very sentiment or passion.” (207) 
 
 The mechanism by which an idea becomes an impression by becoming enlivened 
operates mainly by resemblance5.   
There is a very remarkable resemblance [among human beings], which 
preserves itself amidst all their variety; and this resemblance must very 
much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and 
embrace them with facility and pleasure.” (207).    
 
However, it is also affected a great deal by certain other factors, such as contiguity in 
space and time (how close you are to the person in space and time), and by causation 
(blood relations, for example)6.   
Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our 
natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or 
country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the 
relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the 
imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the 
vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own 
person. (207, bold emphasis mine.) 
 
Your feelings of sympathy for your neighbor are more pronounced than your feelings of 
sympathy for someone in a distant country whom you have never met (contiguity).7  
Hume writes,  
                                                 
5“The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make 
the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the 
idea of our own person” (207). 
6“The relations of blood, being a species of causation, may sometimes contribute to the same effect…” 
(207). 
7“The sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov’d from us, and require the relation of 
contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely” (207). 
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When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, we are 
oblig’d not only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the intermediate 
space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress 
every moment; being every moment recall’d to the consideration of 
ourselves and our present situation. ‘Tis easily conceiv’d, that this 
interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the action of the mind, and 
hindering the conception from being so intense and continu’d, as when we 
reflect on a nearer object.  The fewer steps we make to arrive at the object, 
and the smoother the road is, this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly 
felt, but still may be observ’d more or less in proportion to the degrees of 
distance and difficulty. (274) 
 
Similarly, according to Hume, your feelings of sympathy for your relatives will be more 
pronounced than your feelings of sympathy for those to whom you are not related (cause 
and effect).  Your mind is more easily carried from yourself to your relatives than it is 
from yourself to strangers. 
 With a basic understanding of Hume’s account of sympathy before us, we are 
now in a position to consider the context in which Hume introduces the general point of 
view in the Treatise.  The general point of view is Hume’s attempt to answer an objection 
according to which moral feelings cannot be the result of sympathy.  According to the 
objection, we can experience variations in our sympathy even when there are no 
corresponding variations in our moral judgments.  If this is true, according to the 
objector, morality cannot be a function of our sympathy.  Hume, as the objector, writes, 
When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we 
are pleas’d with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of 
pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of 
pleasure.  But as this sympathy is very variable, it may be thought, that our 
sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations….  But 
notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same 
approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England.  They 
appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem 
of a judicious spectator.  The sympathy varies without a variation in our 




Since the mechanism of sympathy depends upon the relation of ideas to enliven one’s 
idea of someone else’s feelings into an impression, we feel sympathy more strongly when 
the action is near us physically or socially.  Resemblance, causation, and continuity in 
space and time each will have a greater enlivening effect when we are closer to the action 
in question (closer either physically or socially).  The objector exploits this variation in 
our sympathy by contrasting it with our steadier moral judgments.  Whereas we might be 
more pleased by benevolence in someone near to us (physically or socially) than by the 
same degree of benevolence in someone who is far away, we feel the same amount of 
moral approbation for the two.  The objector concludes that, since our sympathy varies 
but our moral approbation does not, our moral approbation cannot be a function of our 
sympathy. 
The objector attributes a certain kind of universality to moral approval and 
disapproval,8 and Hume does not dispute this universality.  The force of the objection 
comes from the perception that Hume’s theory (centered, as it is, on our sentiments of 
sympathy) cannot explain the universality of moral reactions.  True moral reactions are 
universal, in the sense that they are consistent within reactor as well as between reactors. 
We can distinguish two kinds of universality that are implied (if only loosely) in 
the objection.  First, we feel the same approval or disapproval of everyone, no matter how 
near or far.  Hume writes, “…notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the 
same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England.”  In other words, 
our moral reactions remain constant no matter who is the object of our reaction, no matter 
                                                 
8I will refer to moral approval and moral disapproval as “moral reactions” for short.  This term may not be 
completely accurate, but it is more accurate than “moral judgments”, since moral approval and moral 
disapproval are feelings.  “Judgment” would seem to imply that these feelings are the result of an exercise 
of our faculty of reason, which they are not.  I will return to this issue in much more detail in section 2. 
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what is the relationship we have with the object of our reaction.  For example, if we 
approve of benevolence in our friend, we will approve of the same amount of 
benevolence in someone we have never met, in a faraway country.  The assumption of 
the consistency of moral reactions (within a reactor) by the objector is explicit in the 
objection, and in fact is at the heart of the objection.   
 A second kind of universality is that we all have these feelings and agree in our 
moral reactions of approval and disapproval.  If I feel moral approval for benevolence in 
my friend, you will feel moral approval as well (upon considering his benevolence), even 
if he isn’t your friend—even if he is in a faraway country.9  This kind of universality is 
more loosely implied.  The language chosen to express the objection, however, certainly 
suggests that we all agree in our feelings of moral approval and disapproval.  He writes, 
“we are pleas’d with it, and approve of it,” “we give the same approbation to the same 
moral qualities in China as in England,”  and “our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from 
sympathy” (bold emphases mine).  His use of the first-person plural rather than singular 
suggests moral agreement.   
Hume, we ought to note, seems to agree with the objector about the universality 
of moral reactions.  Rather than dispute the underpinnings of this objection (the 
universality of moral reactions), he introduces the general point of view as an answer to 
the objection.   
Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; 
and ‘tis impossible we cou’d ever converse together on any reasonable 
terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they 
appear from his peculiar point of view. 
 
                                                 
9As we will see later, this approval is only guaranteed under good conditions—that both of us, for example, 





In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at 
a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general 
points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, 
whatever may be our present situation. (371-2). 
 
The introduction of the General Point of View captures the first kind of universality that 
Hume and the objector agree morality has, and makes the second kind of universality 
possible.10  When we adopt the general point of view, we ignore the differences that 
distance and time can make to our non-moral reactions.  From the general point of view, 
it does not matter how close to or far from someone we are.  We adopt a point of view 
where we ignore the features particular to us, in our particular circumstances (in fact, 
where we ignore, or at least counterbalance, features particular to any one individual).   
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our 
situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam’d or 
prais’d, and according to the present disposition of our mind.  But these 
variations we regard not, in our general decisions, but still apply the terms 
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain’d 
in one point of view.   
 
The point of view must be one where we ignore or counterbalance those particular 
features, because that is how it becomes general. 
 Hume’s theory of abstract ideas can help us understand the details of how we 
adopt a general point of view.  The groundwork that makes it possible is that we notice 
similarities in things and use the same word for all these objects.   
When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often 
occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences 
we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever 
other differences may appear among them (18-19). 
 
                                                 
10The second kind of universality is captured by the fact that we have feelings of sympathy from this 
general perspective, and all humans have sympathy.  Therefore, we all have these feelings. 
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Once we have this custom, using the word for one thing leaves us disposed to call to 
mind some of the other things to which the word applies. 
But as the same word is suppos’d to have been frequently apply’d to other 
individuals, that are different in many respects from that idea, which is 
immediately present to the mind; the word not being able to revive the 
idea of all these individuals, only touches the soul, if I may be allow’d so 
to speak, and revives that custom, which we have acquired by surveying 
them (18-19). 
 
However, we will not actually call these other objects to mind unless we have some need 
to do so or are prompted. 
They are not really and in fact present to the mind, but only in power; nor 
do we draw them all out distinctly in the imagination, but keep ourselves 
in a readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present 
design or necessity.  The word raises up an individual idea, along with a 
certain custom; and that custom produces any other individual one, for 
which we may have occasion. (19) 
 
There are at least two ways, consistent with this theory of abstract ideas, that we 
could make our point of view general.  We can abstract from the features of the situation, 
or we can abstract from the point of view itself.  To elaborate:  on the one hand, when we 
are considering a situation where there is a feature that is particular to our situation, we 
could substitute that feature for another comparable feature that would remove the bias.  
For example, if I discover that my friend has been laundering money, the fact that the 
perpetrator is my friend may be biasing me in my appraisal of the situation.  To 
counteract this bias, I may imagine that someone who wasn’t my friend was the 
perpetrator, and see how that would affect my appraisal.  I will probably need to imagine 
several other people in the situation (both as perpetrators and as victims) to come to a 
truly general point of view.  Substituting the other people for both perpetrators and 
victims in the situation will help me locate bias and counteract it, making my point of 
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view more general and less specifically mine.  On the other hand, I could instead imagine 
the points of view of several other people who are not his friend.  I could imagine the 
point of view from his acquaintances, his family, his enemies, and people who never met 
him or heard of him.  I could further imagine the point of view from the friends, enemies, 
and acquaintances of the victim, as well as people who never met or heard of the victim.  
Presumably, this also is a way of counteracting bias and making the point of view more 
general and less specifically mine.  
Let us return to the objection that sympathy cannot play the central role in 
Hume’s system, since sympathy is variable and morality is not.  The key to answering the 
objection that morality cannot be a function of sympathy is noticing that once we have 
adopted a more general perspective, we will have the same feelings regardless of 
distance.  The feelings of sympathy that are relevant to our moral reactions (moral 
approval and moral disapproval) are not variable in the way the objector thought they 
were.   
Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed 
‘twere impossible we cou’d ever make use of language, or communicate 
our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary 
appearances of things, and overlook our present situation. (372) 
 
The feelings of sympathy that are relevant to our moral reactions are those feelings that 
we have after we have taken up the general point of view, and those feelings are 
consistent across differences in distance and time.   
‘Tis therefore from the influence of characters and qualities, upon those 
who have an intercourse with any person, that we blame or praise him.  
We consider not whether the persons, affected by the qualities, be our 
acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners.  Nay, we over-look 
our own interest in those general judgments; and blame not a man for 
opposing us in any of our pretensions, when his own interest is 
particularly concern’d.  We make allowance for a certain degree of 
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selfishness in men; because we know it to be inseparable from human 
nature, and inherent in our frame and constitution.  By this reflection we 
correct those sentiments of blame, which so naturally arise upon any 
opposition. (372). 
 
 Hume introduces the general point of view because he recognizes that in order for 
his theory to be a theory about morality, our moral reactions must meet certain criteria.  
The general point of view is supposed to help us experience moral reactions that meet 
these criteria.  Hume introduces the general point of view because he and the objector 
share as common ground the belief that a theory about morality must include and explain 
the two kinds of universality described above. 
 The universality of morality depends on the universality (which here takes the 
form of consistency) of our sympathetic reactions and the effects of the associations of 
ideas.  Without the universality of sympathetic reactions (combined with the stable 
effects of the association of ideas), there would be no fact of the matter about what 
someone who had adopted a general point of view would feel.  I may feel one reaction 
when I adopt the general point of view and consider a crime, and you may feel a different 
reaction when you adopt the general point of view and consider the same crime.  Only the 
universality of sympathetic reactions can ensure that we feel the same reaction when we 
consider the same crime from the general point of view. 
 Let us now turn to the Enquiry.  In the Enquiry, Hume refines and elaborates on 
the idea of the general point of view and the presupposition of universality in the moral 
domain.  He turns his attention to the domain of concepts and language, and he explores 
the commitments that we adopt when we use the concepts and speak the language of 
morality.  He writes, 
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The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, 
which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes 
every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning 
it.  It also implies some sentiment so universal and comprehensive as to 
extend to all mankind and render the actions and conduct, even of the 
persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as 
they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. (74-5).11 
 
Hume begins by claiming that the very idea of morality implies some universal sentiment.  
He then analyzes the implied universal sentiment as being universal in two ways.  The 
sentiment is universal in the same two ways we saw earlier in the Treatise (although 
presented in reverse order here).  The sentiment is universal in the sense that we all have 
feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation; furthermore, we have interpersonal 
agreement in our moral reactions.12 The sentiment is also universal in the sense that our 
moral reactions are consistent through changes in the object of our reactions, despite 
variations that would affect our feelings of sympathy, such as variations in distance and 
time.13  While you may hate the villain who robbed you more than I hate him, our moral 
disapproval is equal. 
His comments in the Enquiry are interestingly ambiguous between expressing 
reactions and expressing judgments.  When I call someone “virtuous”, I could be 
expressing moral approval (approval from the general point of view), or I could be 
making a judgment that the person meets the criteria for having a virtue (on Hume’s 
                                                 
11 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind.  Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1983. 
 
12This is what he means when he writes that the sentiment “recommends the same object to general 
approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it.”  
This is the universality that was only loosely implied in the language of the objection in the Treatise. 
13This is what he means when he writes, “It also implies some sentiment so universal and comprehensive as 
to extend to all mankind and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, and 
object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is 
established.”  This is the universality that was at the heart of the objection in the Treatise. 
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theory, that would be that he has a quality that is useful or beneficial, or immediately 
agreeable, to himself or others).  On the first understanding, I would be expressing certain 
feelings, whereas on the second I would be performing (and reporting) a certain cognitive 
act.  For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to these quite different acts under the joint term 
“evaluations” (and, therefore, intend to use “evaluation” in a way that does not privilege 
its use to refer to judgments as opposed to sentiments).  
 It would be a mistake to think that the sentiment of humanity that Hume employs 
in his explanation of morality in the Enquiry is just a different word for the sentiment of 
sympathy as used in the Treatise. Rather, the feelings of humanity are a subset of the 
sympathetic sentiments he wrote about in the Treatise.  The feelings of humanity are 
those sympathetic sentiments that are universal.  He writes, about sentiments of 
humanity, 
But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or 
depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in 
which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him….  He must 
move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to 
which all mankind have an accord and sympathy. (75) 
 
The feelings of humanity he describes in the Enquiry are not sympathetic responses to the 
plight (or good fortune) of another person.  Sympathetic responses, as we learned, can 
vary according to factors such as proximity to another person in distance and time.  
Rather, these feelings are responses to someone’s character and behavior.  Our response 
is approval, if the character or behavior tends to be useful or immediately agreeable to 
one’s self or to others; disapproval, if the character or behavior tends to the opposite (and, 
of course, there is a third possibility, a neutral response, when the character or behavior is 
neither positive nor negative on these dimensions).  These feelings do not vary according 
to proximity in the way our sympathetic responses do.  He says, 
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But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in 
all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but 
they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose 
conduct or character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of 
censure or approbation. (75) 
 
As we saw in the Treatise, feelings of sympathy do not need to be universal.  In fact, it 
was just that feature of sympathetic sentiments that led to the introduction of the general 
point of view in the first place.  However, in the Enquiry, Hume writes that the 
distinction between the sentiments of humanity and other sentiments is that the 
sentiments of humanity are universal, whereas all other sentiments are not14. 
Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, 
procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle 
in them: But what serves my avarice and ambition pleases these passions 
in me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of 
mankind.  (76)  
 
Here, again, Hume shapes his moral theory to accommodate the kinds of universality that 
must be present in any moral theory.  However, rather than taking our moral reactions as 
a starting point, as he seems to in the Treatise, here he begins with our moral language.  
He begins by exploring moral language, and finds that our moral language implies 
universality.  Moral language and moral concepts themselves imply something 
universal.15   
Hume thinks that morality implies a universal sentiment because when we speak 
using moral language, we speak having adopted the general point of view, and we expect 
that others have adopted this point of view as well.  As such, when we use the language 
                                                 
14The capacity to have feelings of sympathy is universal, even in the Treatise, but any given sympathetic 
feeling could fail to be universal, unless the individual in question had already adopted the general point of 
view. 




of morality to express our moral reactions, and even our moral judgments, our language 
implies an expectation that everyone will agree and a belief of ourselves that we are not 
influenced by our own particular circumstances.16 
 He writes, describing our language when making evaluations outside of the 
domain of morality, 
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his 
adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to 
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular 
circumstances and situation (75). 
 
Hume continues immediately to describe the language involved in moral evaluations,  
But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or 
depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in 
which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him (75). 
 
For many non-moral evaluations, such as evaluations of what one most wants or 
evaluations about what would be best for one (prudential evaluations) the point of view 
adopted is simply that of the speaker.  For evaluations about what one wants, whatever 
feelings strike the speaker, at that moment, in that particular mood, in that particular 
context, count as relevant to his evaluation.  For prudential evaluations, we are more 
strict about what counts as relevant, although the point of view is still that of the 
speaker—but considerations about long-term ends, and the relative strengths of various 
                                                 
16Jensen offers a similar interpretation.  He writes that Hume “…provides clear outlines of a theory of 
moral language.  According to this theory, to employ moral language is to be committed to setting 
restrictions on what we are prepared to regard as a moral term or a moral judgment.  Moral language may 
not be used to express purely private sentiments occasioned by some particular circumstance at some 
particular time.  Instead, moral judgments must be universalizable, they must concern everyone and must 
concern a kind of act” (502).  Jensen, however, also claims that we cannot get substantive moral judgments 
from the requirements of moral language, and I disagree.  I argue that moral judgments are judgments about 
what feelings we would have from the general point of view.  More on this later.  Henning Jensen, “Hume 
on Moral Agreement”, Mind  New Series, v.86:344, pp. 497-513. 
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desires will play more of a role in this kind of evaluation.  However, again, the point of 
view is only the speaker’s point of view.17 
 For moral evaluations, however, the point of view adopted must be the general 
point of view, a point of view where we ignore (or at least counterbalance) the features 
particular to that speaker (namely, ourselves), in our particular circumstance—in fact, we 
ignore the features particular to any one individual.  The point of view must be one where 
we ignore those particular features, because that is how it becomes general.  Once a 
person speaks from the general point of view, he can engage the moral sentiments of 
others, who can also look upon the situation without bias from features particular to 
themselves.  
We have seen that Hume’s answer to the objection in the Treatise is to argue that 
moral reactions and judgments imply two kinds of universality, and that therefore when 
we make such judgments or experience such reactions, we make them having already 
adopted the general point of view.  I have argued that Hume identifies two kinds of 
universality that are implied by moral language and moral evaluations.  I have further 
argued that the general point of view is Hume’s way of accommodating the universality 
of morality.  
Section 2: Cohon’s objection 
 Let us turn to an issue that some commentators have seen as a tension in Hume’s 
view.  These commentators interpret the general point of view as a hypothetical 
construct, and moral evaluations are evaluations about what we would feel from the 
                                                 
17We can make judgments about what another most wants, or what is most prudential for another person.  
In this case, the point of view adopted will be that of the subject of our consideration.  So, if I make a 
judgment about what is most prudential for Jim, then in making that judgment, I attempt to adopt his point 
of view, and consider his long-term ends and the relative strengths of his desires. 
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general point of view.  If the general point of view is a hypothetical construct, however, 
then there seems to be a tension between those passages in which Hume claims that 
reason has no role in moral evaluations and those passages in which Hume says that 
moral evaluations must be made from the general point of view.  Since, prima facie, 
judgments about what we would feel from a point of view that is explicitly not our own 
seem to require the use of our faculty of reason, reason on this interpretation would seem 
to have quite a large role in moral evaluations.  Furthermore, if Hume is understood as 
claiming that reason has no role in moral evaluations, we are left with a question about 
how to understand the role of our faculty of reason in the context of the general point of 
view.  This tension raises questions about how much of Hume’s seeming non-cognitivism 
or antirationalism18 must be abandoned in light of his comments about the general point 
of view.  If morality “consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover’d by the 
understanding” (301), then how can we maintain that moral judgments are judgments 
about how we would feel (which judgments we presumably could not make without our 
faculty of reason)?  Hume says, “morality…is more properly felt than judg’d of,” (p.302).  
If this is true, how could judgments about morality be possible at all?   
Cohon articulates this problem clearly and compellingly: 
Moral evaluations become inductive empirical beliefs about what we 
would feel if we really occupied the imagined common point of view, and 
hence the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts Hume’s claim that 
the making of a moral evaluation is not an activity of reason but of 
sentiment.   
                                                 
18These are two distinct interpretations.  If we read Hume as a traditional non-cognitivist, then when he 
writes that “virtue and vice are not matters of fact” (301), we take that to mean that all moral discourse is 
just an expression of a sentiment, and not referring to external moral facts.  So, if I say that some action is 
virtuous, and you say that same action is not virtuous, we do not disagree, since it is entirely consistent for 
me to have a sentiment of approval and for you to have a sentiment of disapproval.  If we read Hume as an 
anti-rationalist, then the thesis is somewhat weaker—there can be moral facts, but we cannot learn of them 




Any explanation or interpretation of Hume’s use of the general point of view must 
respect certain central passages in which Hume claims that morality is the product of 
sentiment and not reason.  In addition to the preceding passages, consider:  
But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not 
matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? (301). 
 
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a 
particular kind from the contemplation of a character.  The very feeling 
constitutes our praise or admiration….  Our approbation is imply’d in the 
immediate pleasure they convey to us  (303). 
 
If virtue and vice are determined by feelings and sentiments that can only be felt from a 
particular point of view (a point of view, it might seem, that is explicitly not our own), 
then it would seem that our moral judgments are the result of reason.  Cohon writes, 
The resulting account seems to treat moral judgments as cognitions, 
specifically, beliefs (frequently counterfactual ones) about what someone 
or anyone would feel if she occupied a point of view close to the person 
being evaluated.  This would make moral evaluations into inductive, 
empirical beliefs, presumably based on past experience of the effects of 
people’s character traits on themselves and their closest associates.  Such 
beliefs are, for Hume, the deliverances of (causal) reason (833). 
 
In these passages, Hume is quite explicit that our faculty of reason cannot be the 
source of any “knowledge” of morals.  It seems, therefore, that if Hume introduces the 
general point of view as a tool for evaluating traits of character and actions, used by our 
faculty of reason, then he will have gone back on his earlier claims that reason has no role 
in moral evaluation.  The interpretive task at hand, then, is to explain the role of the 
general point of view within Hume’s system without contradicting any of his earlier 
claims.  
 We saw in the preceding section that, for Hume, moral evaluations concern our 
feelings from the general point of view.  Moral approval is the approval we feel toward 
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certain characters or behaviors after we have taken up the general point of view, and 
moral disapproval is the disapproval we feel when regarding other characters or 
behaviors from the general point of view.  It is that feature, in part, that differentiates 
moral evaluations from, for example, prudential evaluations. 
 If we understand the general point of view not as a hypothetical construct, but 
instead as an actual point of view that we can and do adopt, we do not need to view 
morally relevant feelings as the “deliverances of causal reason,” as Cohon says.  Rather, 
we should regard them as actual feelings we have when we look at a situation from a 
point of view that is not biased in the way our own point of view usually is.  As we saw 
earlier, this is not a foreign experience—we do this in our daily lives.  I can and do make 
prudential evaluations for other people by looking at something from their perspective.  
We plead to others, “but look at it from my point of view.”  There is no reason to think 
we cannot similarly adopt a “general” point of view for moral evaluations. 
 However, the tension Cohon and other commentators discuss raises another 
important issue which should not be quickly dismissed.  As Cohon pointed out, there are 
places in the Treatise where Hume seems to say that reason plays no role in morality.  
For our account to be complete, we must account for these passages.  Later in this 
section, I will use one of Hume’s central arguments to illustrate why he does not actually 
mean that reason plays no role in morality.  It is true that Hume does clearly rule out 
reason in some facets of moral evaluation.  I will argue, however, that for Hume, we do 
use our faculty of reason to make some moral evaluations.  On my interpretation of 
Hume’s view, we use our faculty of reason to make moral judgments. 
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Let us first recognize that there are two quite different features of moral 
experience in Hume’s account.  On the one hand, there are moral reactions—these are the 
sentiments of pleasure, or approval, and displeasure, or disapproval, one feels when 
reflecting on another person’s character or behavior.  We feel these sentiments of 
pleasure or displeasure, approval or disapproval, derived from sympathy, upon the survey 
of some character or action.  These sentiments are, for Hume, primary moral experiences.  
On the other hand, there are moral judgments: judgments that an action is right or wrong 
or that a quality of character is virtuous or vicious.19  These are our judgments that 
something is wrong because it would meet with disapproval (or our judgment that 
something is right because it would meet with approval) from the general point of view.  
This sort of judgment is secondary in a way, because the evidence in favor of such a 
judgment can only be, for Hume, our (or others’) primary moral experiences.20  Our 
moral reactions form the basis of all of our moral judgments and experiences.  That is, 
our moral judgments are about our (actual and hypothetical) moral reactions, and the only 
evidence we can have in favor or against moral judgments are moral reactions, both our 
                                                 
19On Hume’s account, the judgment that an action is wrong or that a character trait is a vice is the judgment 
that it (action or trait) would meet with disapproval from the general point of view—the judgment that it is 
right or a virtue is the judgment that it would meet with approval from the general point of view.  Of 
course, someone other than Hume could judge that something is wrong using different criteria than the ones 
Hume himself presents, while still maintaining the central role of the general point of view in moral 
evaluation. 
20We should here distinguish between moral reactions and what I will call psuedo-moral reactions, even 
though Hume does not explicitly make this distinction.  Moral reactions are reactions that are had under 
appropriate circumstances—that is, from a general point of view.  Psuedo-moral reactions are reactions 
that we take to be moral reactions, but, unbeknownst to us, they are not actually had under appropriate 
circumstances.  For example, if I feel I have been slighted, I may believe that I have successfully adopted 
the general point of view, but I may still be biased in my indignation.  In this case, judgments that are made 
when I believe I have adopted the general point of view but have not are psuedo-moral.  Both moral 
reactions and psuedo-moral reactions are taken as evidence for our moral judgments, but only moral 
reactions determine virtue and vice, on Hume’s view. 
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own and that of others.21  It is in this sense that our moral reactions are primary moral 
evidence. 
 Resolving the textual tension involves seeing that when Hume argues that 
morality is the domain of sentiment and not reason, he is claiming that our moral 
reactions are not the product of reason.  When he writes that morality is more properly 
felt than judged, he means that sentiments (our moral reactions) are our primary moral 
evidence.  Consider the following quotations:  
Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude…[that] it must be by 
means of some impression or sentiment [vice and virtue] they occasion, 
that we are able to mark the difference between them….  Morality, 
therefore, is more properly felt than judg’d of… (302).   
 
An action or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because 
its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind.  In giving a 
reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain 
the vice or virtue….  To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a 
satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character 
(303). 
 
We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in 
feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that 
it is virtuous (303). 
 
In each of these passages, Hume is describing our primary moral experiences, our moral 
reactions.22  He is only concerned with arguing that our moral reactions are not the 
product of reason, and not at all concerned with arguing that our faculty of reason cannot 
make judgments about moral reactions.   
                                                 
21It’s important to keep in mind that anyone’s moral reactions can be evidence for my moral judgments.  
While my own moral reactions are the most easily accessible evidence for me, the moral reactions of others 
are also relevant to my judgment that something would or would not be approved of from a general point of 
view. 
22I will consider one of his arguments in detail later. 
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In fact, it is difficult to see what reason there is to doubt that our faculty of reason 
could make judgments about moral reactions.  Cohon and other commentators go wrong 
by failing to appreciate fully the difference between reactions, on the one hand, and 
evaluations in the sense of judgments, on the other, and the significance of the distinction 
for Hume’s theory.  Hume does think that morality is not constituted by reason, but that is 
not enough to make him a noncognitivist.  He leaves room for us to make judgments 
about moral reactions—just so long as our moral reactions are not perceived as 
themselves being the result of a process of reasoning. 
 Hume goes on to suggest that we can form judgments on the basis of our moral 
reactions.  If it is true that we can form judgments on the basis of our moral reactions, 
then there is not actually any tension between the role of the general point of view and 
Hume’s remarks about the impossibility of our knowledge of morals being the product of 
our faculty of reason.  The judgments we make about how we would feel from this 
general perspective are secondary moral judgments, and do not clash at all with his 
claims that morality (i.e. our moral reactions) cannot be the product of our faculty of 
reason.23  For example, he writes, 
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one 
perform’d in our neighborhood the other day:  The meaning of which is, 
that we know from reflection, that the former action wou’d excite as 
strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac’d in the same 
position (373; bold emphasis mine). 
 
                                                 
23There are also the feelings we have after having adopted the general point of view.  These are moral 
sentiments, our moral reactions, and are not judgments about how we would feel if we did adopt the 
general point of view.  These are very important pieces of primary moral evidence.  My task here is just to 
defend the possibility of judgments about how we would feel from the general point of view in cases where 
we have not actually adopted the general point of view. 
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When we judge that the historical action is equally as bad as the recent action in our 
neighborhood, the content of that judgment essentially includes that we and others do and 
would experience equally strong sentiments (moral reactions) from the general point of 
view.  Sometimes the general point of view is actually adopted (this is one way to get 
evidence in favor of the judgment); at other times, we deduce what someone in the 
general point of view would feel.  Either way, the evaluation/judgment relies on our 
primary moral reactions.  Again, while he is explicit that our moral reactions cannot be 
the result of a process of reasoning, he has not taken the extra step that would make him a 
noncognitivist—namely, claiming that we cannot make judgments about morality using 
our faculty of reason. 
To make it even more clear that this is what Hume means, we can turn our 
attention to one of the arguments where he purportedly argues that reason has no role in 
morality.  Take the argument in the following passage, which he claims “proves directly 
that actions do not derive their merit from conformity to reason, nor their blame from a 
contrariety to it” (295).  Examining this argument will help support our earlier claim, 
which is that Hume does think there is a role for reason in moral evaluation, and that 
Hume is not a noncognitivist, as Cohon and others suppose. The examination of this 
argument will show on Hume’s view exactly what role reason can play in moral 
judgment.  He writes, 
Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood.  Truth or falsehood consists 
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to 
real existence and matter of fact.  Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible 
of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and 
can never be an object of our reason.  Now ‘tis evident our passions, 
volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or 
disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, 
and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions.  ‘Tis 
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impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d either true or false, and be 
either contrary or conformable to reason (295). 
 
We should take care to distinguish two separate claims here, both of which Hume seems 
to argue for, although it is not entirely clear which he has in mind at any given time.  On 
the one hand, he argues that our faculty of reason cannot be the source of our knowledge 
about morals.  On the other hand, he argues that reason (but not our faculty of reason) 
does not determine what is virtuous and what is vicious (i.e. there is not a real relation of 
ideas that settles the virtue/vice question).   
Let me say a bit more about what I take the distinction between reason and the 
faculty of reason to be.  Reason seems to provide the standard at which our faculty of 
reason aims—so that our faculty of reason is operating properly when it reasons along the 
lines that reason demands.  Reason determines the real relations of ideas, whereas our 
faculty of reason attempts to conform to reason, such as by identifying those real 
relations and discovering real existence and matters of fact.24  Reason can be identified as 
what makes a line of reasoning successful, and it is our faculty of reason that carries out 
this line of reasoning.25   
Let us return to Hume’s argument.  The structure of this argument is difficult to 
follow, but I think it goes something like this:  Hume’s strategy is to emphasize that we 
can know what can be conformable to reason by learning what can be an object of our 
faculty of reason.  If something is conformable to reason, then it is something that can be 
                                                 
24For example, if I make a bad inference (e.g. from “P->Q” and “Q”, I infer “P”), the faculty of reason is 
operating improperly—because reason would not license the inference.   
25Contrast “reason” with “right reason” or “reason when functioning successfully.  The latter two cases 
describe a situation where the faculty of reason is operating successfully—and we can say it is operating 
successfully because of a conformity to reason.  
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an object of our faculty of reason.  If it is not conformable to reason, then it cannot be an 
object of our faculty of reason.   
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement [to real relations 
of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact], is incapable of being true 
or false, and can never be an object of our reason (295, bold emphasis 
mine).  
 
1. Passions, volitions and actions are in principle not conformable to reason (because 
they are not truth-apt). 
2. If passions, volitions and actions are in principle not conformable to reason, and if 
therefore there is no relation of ideas that serves to license or forbid inferences 
about vice and virtue, then reason cannot be what determines what is virtuous and 
vicious.  For Hume, because there is no relation of ideas that serves to license or 
forbid these inferences, passions, volitions and actions cannot derive their merit 
from conformity to reason.  
3. Therefore, reason does not determine what is virtuous and what is vicious. 
’Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d either true or false, and 
be either contrary or conformable to reason. 
 
4. Therefore, our faculty of reason cannot give us any knowledge of virtue and vice.   
Hume begins this argument by looking at what can (and cannot) conform to reason.  
Since the objects of moral evaluation (passions, volitions and actions) cannot conform to 
reason, their “merit” cannot derive from such conformity.  Therefore, we cannot learn of 
their merit by using our faculty of reason.  While we can learn something about morality 
using causal reasoning, (and Hume’s moral theory is an example of using causal 
reasoning to learn something about morality!), we cannot learn the merit of anything—
that can only be felt. 
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Hume’s clear primary aim in this argument is to show that reason does not license 
or forbid inferences about virtue and vice (at least, inferences where the conclusion of the 
argument is that someone is virtuous or something is vicious).  To see this, consider his 
summary of the argument’s accomplishments as follows: 
[This argument] proves directly that actions do not derive their merit from 
a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it 
proves the same truth more indirectly, by showing us, that as reason can 
never immediately prevent or produce an action by contradicting or 
approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction betwixt moral 
good and evil, which are found to have that influence (295). 
 
Hume concludes, therefore, that passions, volitions, and actions do not derive their merit 
from conformity to reason.   
Hume thinks that by proving that reason does not determine virtue and vice, he 
will prove that our faculty of reason cannot be the source of our knowledge about virtue 
and vice.  Consider the following two claims: 
1. Our faculty of reason is the source of our knowledge about virtue and vice 
2. Reason determines what is virtuous and what is vicious (i.e. that there are 
relations of ideas that license or forbid judgments about what is virtuous and 
what is vicious).   
I have argued that, for Hume, the first claim would derive from and depend on the second 
claim.  For Hume, showing the second claim to be false will itself show the first claim to 
be false.  In this argument, the only reason we have been given for thinking that the first 
claim is false is that reason does not determine virtue and vice.  Hume has not given us an 
independent reason for thinking that our knowledge of virtue and vice does not come 
from our faculty of reason.   
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Once we see that the only reason we have to think that our faculty of reason does 
not give us knowledge about virtue and vice is that reason does not determine virtue and 
vice, we can see that Hume’s conclusion is only that our faculty of reason will not 
provide access to primary moral evidence.  However, this argument does not at all 
demonstrate that our faculty of reason cannot aid us in making secondary moral 
judgments (for which the primary moral evidence would be our sentiments, our moral 
reactions).  Commentators, such as Cohon, who read Hume as being a noncognitivist, 
seem to mistake him to be making the latter claim in addition—that our faculty of reason 
cannot aid us in making secondary moral judgments.  However, as we have seen, the text 
seems to suggest otherwise—that Hume’s only concern is to prove that our faculty of 
reason cannot provide us with primary moral evidence, not that our faculty of reason 
cannot aid us in making secondary moral judgments.  
 Hume argues that our moral reactions cannot be discovered by using our faculty 
of reason.  He does not claim that we cannot use our moral reactions as evidence in moral 
judgments.  Consider the following passage: 
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any 
relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin’d, will prove with 
equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be 
discover’d by the understanding.  This is the second part of our argument; 
and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an 
object of reason.   
 
Hume here (similarly to the argument discussed above) argues from his claim that 
morality is not determined by reason, to the claim that we cannot use our faculty of 
reason to discover moral facts.  But, as we have just seen, this sort of argument is best 
understood as an argument that our moral reactions cannot be discovered via our faculty 
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of reason, and not as an argument that our faculty of reason has no place in morality (say, 
in making secondary moral judgments).26 
 I have argued that the supposed tension between certain of Hume’s claims (such 
as when he claims that morality is felt, not judged) and the introduction of a general point 
of view can be resolved by making a distinction between primary moral evidence and 
secondary moral judgments.  The passages that Cohon cites seem, on a first pass, to be in 
tension with the cognitivist implications of the general point of view, but the distinction I 
articulated helps to relieve this tension.  Specifically, the passages she cites in which 
Hume argues that our knowledge of morals cannot be the product of our faculty of reason 
are best understood as passages in which Hume is concerned with arguing that our moral 
reactions (which are our primary moral evidence) cannot be known via our faculty of 
reason.  Hume seems to be quite comfortable with the possibility that we sometimes 
reason about our moral reactions, and he certainly at times suggests that we can reason 
about how we would feel from the general point of view.      
This resolution to the problem can gain traction when we notice that Hume 
compares morality to things like colors, which are plausibly understood dispositionally.  
If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or considerable 
uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the 
                                                 
26Cohon herself offers an interpretation of Hume that bears similarity to the interpretation I offer above.  
She argues that Hume offers what she calls a “moral sensing” view, on which there are two types of moral 
perception.  She distinguishes between moral impressions and moral ideas.  Moral impressions (similar to 
what I call moral reactions) are felt, whereas moral ideas (similar to what I call moral judgments), which 
have cognitive content, are not felt.  She writes, “But one crucial passage shows him to believe that moral 
properties are essentially reaction-dependent properties: they depend for their existence on the emotional 
responses of sensitive beings.  This makes him an ethical anti-realist in our sense….But his anti-realist 
view is perfectly compatible with truth-cognitivism” (7).  We disagree, however, in our interpretation of the 
content of what she calls moral ideas and what I call moral judgment.  She argues that moral ideas cannot 
be causal beliefs, i.e. beliefs that a property would cause a certain reaction in a person, for the textual 
reasons we have already discussed.  However, I think that in the relevant passages, Hume is talking about 
moral impressions or moral reactions, and so they are not evidence that moral judgments or ideas cannot 
have causal content. 
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perfect beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in daylight, to 
the eye of   a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even 
while colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses. (Standard 
of taste.) 
 
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and 
cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, 
but perceptions in the mind… (301). 
 
If our knowledge of whether a given object is red or not depends on our knowledge that it 
appears red in good conditions to competent observers, then it seems clear that we can 
make secondary judgments about colors.  Our primary evidence for colors, of course, 
would be our own experiences and sensations of color, but we could also make 
judgments about whether the object appears such-ly in such circumstances.  In that case, 
such judgments would be the product of our faculty of reason.   
  If I am right that Hume is discussing our moral reactions in the passages that 
Cohon finds troubling, then these passages are not any evidence at all that an 
interpretation that emphasizes the role of the general point of view is in conflict with key 
passages in the Treatise.  I have argued that we should interpret Hume as distinguishing 
between moral reactions and moral judgments.  While Hume certainly argues that our 
moral reactions cannot be the result of any process of reasoning, there is no reason to 
suppose that we cannot use our reactions in a process of reasoning to make moral 
judgments.  My interpretation helps show that Hume is not a noncognitivist, and 
therefore that there is no tension between the general point of view and the passages 
where he argues that morality is not an object of reason. 
Section 3: Moral Motivation 
 Cohon’s worry that the introduction of the general point of view is incompatible 
with Hume’s claims that our moral knowledge is not the product of our faculty of reason 
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can naturally be extended to his arguments that morality must be motivating.  If Hume’s 
general point of view turns moral knowledge into a product of reasoning, then moral 
knowledge cannot be motivating.  Yet, Hume is explicit that morality must be 
motivating—that is his reason for claiming that moral knowledge is not a product of 
reasoning.  He argues that Reason and our faculty of reason are not the kind of thing that 
can motivate us, and yet since morality does motivate us, morality cannot depend on 
Reason (and our faculty of reason).  He writes, 
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it 
follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason 
alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have any such influence.  
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.  Reason of itself is 
utterly impotent in this particular.  The rules of morality, therefore, are not 
conclusions of our reason (294). 
 
He also writes, later, 
As long as it is allow’d, that reason has no influence on our passions and 
actions, ‘tis in vain to pretend that morality is discover’d only by a 
deduction of reason. 
 
Any interpretation of Hume’s use of the general point of view needs to respect this 
argument and these passages.  Any interpretation must explain the fact that morality must 
motivate us, and reason cannot do so. 
 The distinction between moral reactions and moral judgments can help us make 
sense of these passages.  Our moral reactions, our moral sentiments, can motivate us.  
Our moral reactions, remember, are our primary moral evidence.  On the basis of our 
primary moral evidence, we can, from time to time, make (secondary) moral judgments, 
judgments about what moral reactions we would have, judgments about what sentiments 
we would have from the general point of view.  These judgments would not serve to 
motivate us, except insofar as we actually feel these sentiments, these moral reactions.  
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The introduction of the general point of view, then, does not require supposing that 
verdicts of reason will motivate us.  It is our own primary moral reactions (sympathetic 
sentiments) that actually motivate us.   
 This reading of Hume’s arguments can help us make sense of some passages that 
otherwise would remain puzzling.  In some of these passages, Hume acknowledges that 
our sentiments and our reason can conflict.  He acknowledges that sometimes our 
sentiments do not agree with our moral judgments.  For example, he writes, 
Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at 
least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn 
and inalterable (372). 
 
Similarly, he also writes,  
 
But however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected 
by those other principles, ‘tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, 
nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory (372). 
 
These passages seem to be in tension with his arguments that morality cannot be derived 
from reason, since reason cannot motivate.  However, once we distinguish between moral 
(and pseudo-moral) reactions, on the one hand, and moral judgments, on the other hand, 
the tension disappears.  Hume explains that our moral judgments cannot always bring our 
sentiments under control.  By way of getting us to take up the general point of view, they 
can influence our sentiments to some extent, but not in ways strong enough to overpower 
our sentiments from our first-person points of view. Clearly, on his view, our moral 
judgments cannot motivate us, since they cannot control our sentiments.  However, we 
can still make them—they are the product of our faculty of reason—and the possibility of 
our making them does not contradict his claim that morality must motivate us.  Consider 
also the following passage: 
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Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial 
conduct, but that ‘tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and that our 
passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment.   
 
Here, he seems to suggest that it is best when our passions and sentiments conform to our 
moral judgment (that is, when things are going as they are supposed to), but that 
sometimes they don’t conform.  Sometimes we continue to feel rogue pseudo-moral 
sentiments, sentiments that are not had from the general point of view.  We can continue 
to feel them, even when our considered moral judgment conflicts with them.   
 These kinds of passages make clear that we must be careful in how we interpret 
his arguments that, since reason cannot motivate, morality cannot be derived from reason.  
In these passages, he clearly suggests that sometimes our moral judgments are correct 
even in the face of contradictory sentiments and passions.  The way to resolve the tension 
between these passages and earlier passages about the motivational power of morality lies 
in the distinction between moral reactions and moral evaluations.  Our moral (and 
pseudo-moral) reactions have motivational power, and our moral (not pseudo-moral) 
reactions determine virtue and vice.  However, we can still make (secondary) moral 
judgments about what is virtuous and what is vicious, using our moral reactions as 
evidence.  In these cases, these moral judgments will not have motivational power.  
 What motivation do we have to adopt the general point of view?  We don’t have 
motivation, per se.  Rather, according to his theory of abstract ideas, we are compelled to 
adopt it whenever we make a judgment that potentially conflicts with the other ideas that 
comprise the general idea at issue.  He writes,  
…after the mind has produc’d an individual idea, upon which we reason, 
the attendant custom, reviv’d by the general or abstract term, readily 
suggests any other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning, that 
agrees not with it.  Thus shou’d we mention the word, triangle, and form 
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the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it, and shou’d we 
afterwards assert, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each 
other, the other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we over-
look’d at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the 
falshood of this proposition, tho’ it be true with relation to that idea, which 
we had form’d. (19) 
 
The process is mostly automated, unless our faculties are not operating properly: 
If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds 
from some imperfection in its faculties; and such-a-one as is often the 
source of false reasoning and sophistry. 
 
In the moral case, the process will proceed similarly.  For example, if I claim that the 
person who stole a bagel from my son is as evil as the person who stole valuable 
medicine from an elderly person in need, my mind will naturally think of other people 
who have stolen similar items (other baked goods, from retailers other than my son), and 
I will realize that I am unwilling to claim that the robbers in these other cases are as 
villainous as the person who stole the medicine from an elderly person. Our mind 
naturally engages in a sort of “challenge-response” whenever we react to a situation and 
make moral judgments about it.  The “challenge” leads to the “response”, which just is 
taking up the general point of view.27,28 
                                                 
27The connection between the reaction and the judgment, for Hume, is less clear, and we need the judgment 
in order to be compelled to enter the general point of view (for it is the judgment that propels us into the 
abstraction of the general point of view).  My suspicion is that, for Hume, the answer will come down (as it 
often does) to the associations of ideas.  For example, if I observe someone stealing from my friend, and I 
have the sympathetic reaction of anger, I will therefore be caused to judge that the thief is bad.  The 
association of ideas will connect anger with bad people, since by and large only bad things tend to cause 
anger.    
28Cohon offers her own explanation of our motivation to adopt the general point of view.  Her view is not 
necessarily in conflict with this view, and in fact the two may complement each other.  On her view, we 
adopt the general point of view because, since our moral judgments form the basis of other, important, 
causal and predictive judgments, we need our moral judgments to form a stable basis so that our predictions 
will be more likely to be true.  “Whenever we make moral evaluations we also make objective, causal 
judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait in question will produce. Because of 
the way we depend on this information, it is very inconvenient to have false judgments of this kind, and for 
different people to make mutually contradictory ones. So it is important to us to insure that they be true and 
consistent. If we make our causal judgments from the common point of view, they tend to be true, and tend 
40 
  
Section 4: Conclusion 
 I will conclude by highlighting the main points I have argued in this paper.  The 
first, and most controversial, position I have taken is to argue that Hume is a cognitivist, 
not a noncognitivist, about ethics.  The passages that are generally taken as demonstrating 
that Hume is a noncognitivist are passages in which he allegedly argues that reason has 
no place in morality.  However, I make a distinction between moral reactions and moral 
judgments, and further I argue that this distinction is important in Hume’s theory.  If this 
distinction is granted, I have argued, the purported noncognitivist passages can instead be 
read as passages in which Hume denies that morality is determined or constituted by 
reason.  This leaves plenty of room in his theory for making judgments about morality, 
which he elsewhere seems to endorse.  Furthermore, since there is no inconsistency 
between a cognitivist moral theory and a moral theory in which morality is not 
determined by reason (for example, utilitarianism is, in many of its instances, such a 
theory), there should be perceived no inconsistency here. 
 Relatedly, I have carefully explored the role of reason and our faculty of reason in 
Hume’s moral theory.  I have argued that for Hume, at the most basic level, there is no 
role for reason.  Morality is constituted by (a subset of) our sentiments, our moral 
reactions, and not at all by the dictates of reason.  However, reason and our faculty of 
reason still have a role to play in morality—namely, the role of making moral judgments.   
                                                                                                                                                 
to be consistent over time and between persons, whereas if we make them without adopting the common 
point of view they tend to be sometimes false and often mutually contradictory” (846).  The only hesitation 
I have about this sort of explanation is whether it is putting the cart before the horse.  Since we appear to 
need a judgment before we can enter the general point of view (since it is the challenge to the judgment 
that allows us to abstract and therefore enter the general point of view), it is unclear whether we can make 
sense of Cohon’s claim that we enter the general point of view in order to make judgments.    
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Furthermore, I have offered an interpretation of the general point of view 
according to which Hume introduces it because of his commitment to the importance of 
universality in morality.  The role of the general point of view itself in his moral theory 
depends on the universality of human feelings.  Without the universality of human 
feelings, there would be no consistency in moral reactions made from the general point of 
view.  The interpretation I have offered draws on his theory of abstract ideas.  According 
to this interpretation, we can actually adopt the general point of view and the sentiments 
we feel having done so are our moral reactions.  When we fail to adopt the general point 
of view, we can instead deduce what we would feel from that point of view, if we so 
choose.   
  Finally, I have argued that my interpretation, an interpretation according to which 
Hume is a cognitivist, an interpretation according to which the distinction between moral 
reactions and moral judgments plays a significant role, dovetails nicely with Hume’s 
remarks on moral motivation.  Hume is explicit that morality must be motivating, and any 
successful moral theory must meet that requirement.  Moral reactions, which are the 
sentiments we feel from the general point of view, are motivating, on my interpretation of 
Hume, thereby meeting his requirement.  The distinction between moral reactions and 
moral judgments allows Hume’s moral theory to have one foot on the reason side and one 
foot on the motivating/sentimental side.  
 
 
Kant and the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
Kant is less explicit than Hume regarding the general point of view, but he is 
explicit about universality.  Kant thinks that the content in the first formulation, the 
universal law formulation, is derived from the very concept of a categorical imperative, 
from the very concept of a moral law.  Furthermore, he thinks, the concept of a moral law 
essentially involves universality.  The categorical imperative is a universal law, and as 
such it applies to all of us.  If the categorical imperative applies to all of us, then we must 
only act in accordance with maxims that can be willed to be universal law, for if the 
maxim cannot be willed to be universal law, then it does not apply to all of us and 
therefore cannot be a principle of morality.  But notice:  this is the universal law 
formulation:  ‘Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law’ (4:222).1 
I will argue that, for Kant, the very concept of a categorical imperative is the 
concept of a universal law.  But I also think that the universal law formulation is Kant’s 
way of capturing the general point of view.  We test our maxims by making sure that they 
could be willed to be universal law—that is, by making sure that they can apply to 
everyone, and not just us.  But this test involves adopting a general or impartial point of 
view, in a way.  It involves ignoring my own aims, inclinations, and desires, and instead 
evaluating the maxim of my action from a general perspective.  Worthy maxims will be 
                                                 
1 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Arnulf Zweig, ed. Thomas E. Hill Jr., 
Arnulf Zweig.  Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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those that I choose, not from my own perspective (keeping in mind my own goals and 
inclinations), but from a more general perspective, one that involves evaluating them for 
adoption universally.   
Some critics have objected that Kant’s argument that the Universal Law 
Formulation (FUL) is a formulation of the Categorical Imperative relies on an invalid 
inference.1,2   The objection tends to hinge on the accusation that Kant confuses, on the 
one hand, the question of what is rational for an agent to will for himself, and on the other 
hand, the question of what is rational for an agent to will for everyone.   
I believe, however, that by distinguishing carefully between what Kant wants to 
accomplish in the universal law formulation and what he wants to accomplish in the 
Humanity Formulation (FH), we can interpret Kant in such a way that he does not make 
the mistake these commentators attribute to him.  I will argue that Kant does not expect 
the general point of view, as expressed in the universal law formulation, alone to pick out 
all and only worthy maxims.  Instead, we must also rely on a universal end—humanity—
and this insight is expressed in Kant’s humanity formulation.  In the end, I hope we will 
be able to say that for Kant as for Hume, the general point of view (as expressed in the 
universal law formulation) is a way of capturing universality, which is essential for any 
proper system of morals. 
                                                 
1E.g. Geoffrey Scarre, “Interpreting the Categorical Imperative,” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, v.6:2, pp. 223-236, and Allen Wood, “Kant on the Rationality of Morals”, Ottawa Congress on 
Kant in the Anglo-American and Continental Traditions, 1976, pp.93-110.  Thomas E. Hill Jr. alludes to 
this difficulty in “Kant’s Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 
v.66, pp. 3-23.  See also Henry E. Allison, “On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical 
Imperative”, Philosophical Topics, v.19:1, pp.2-8. 
2While over the course of the Groundwork, Kant argues for several propositions about FUL, I will focus on 
his claim that FUL formulates the supreme principle of morality, an argument he gives in the discussion in 
ch. 2 (4:221-222).   
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  In this paper, I will consider one such representative argument, that given by 
Wood in “Kant on the Rationality of Morals.”  I will begin, in Section I, by offering a 
“bare-bones” account of Kant.  This bare-bones account will be useful to help us navigate 
between the differing interpretations.  I will go on, in Section II, to discuss Wood’s 
objection in great detail.  His objection is quite compelling, and presents quite a challenge 
for those who wish to defend Kant.  In Section III, I will discuss an interpretation that 
O’Neill offers in “Universal Laws and Ends-in-Themselves”,3 and show how her 
interpretation can help us make headway on this issue.  While I will argue that her 
interpretation is subject to some difficulties, which I will discuss, her interpretation is a 
useful first step towards extricating Kant from these difficulties.  In the last section, I will 
present the interpretation that I believe succeeds in rescuing Kant from Wood’s objection, 
and yet sidesteps the difficulties that O’Neill’s interpretation faced. 
Section 1: Schematic overview of the argument 
 In this section, I will offer a schematic review of the argument that FUL 
formulates the supreme principle of morality, in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, ch.2 (4:221-222).  My intention here is to review the argument in a way that is 
general enough to avoid controversy.  Having a schematic review of the argument will 
help us understand the differences between competing interpretations of Kant, as well as, 
much later, help us articulate how we can rescue Kant from Wood’s objection. 
 The categorical imperative, Kant tells us, is to be contrasted with the hypothetical 
imperative.  According to the hypothetical imperative, we are rationally required to 
pursue the means to our ends.  While the necessity of conforming one’s actions to a 
                                                 
3 Onora O’Neill, “Universal Laws and Ends-In-Themselves,” Monist: An International Quarterly Journal 
of General Philosophical Inquiry, v.72, pp. 341-361. 
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hypothetical imperative depends on one’s commitment to the end so acting would 
obtain4, the necessity of conforming one’s actions to the categorical imperative is not in 
this way conditional.  The categorical imperative, Kant writes, is the one imperative 
“which commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being 
conditional on any further goal to be reached by that conduct” (4:217).  The categorical 
imperative binds us, whatever ends we have. 
After introducing the concept of a categorical imperative, Kant proceeds to offer 
one formulation of it, the universal law formulation (FUL):  “Act only on that maxim by 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (4:222).5 Kant 
thinks that the content in FUL is derived from the very concept of a categorical 
imperative.  In his argument for FUL, he expresses this idea (that the content in FUL is 
derived from the very concept of a categorical imperative) by saying,  
The first part of our task is to see whether perhaps the mere concept of a 
categorical imperative might also give us the formula containing the only 
proposition that can be a categorical imperative (4:221). 
 
And he continues, 
But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know right away what it 
contains.  For since this imperative contains, besides the law, only the 
necessity that the maxim conform to this law, while the law, as we have 
seen, contains no condition limiting it, there is nothing left over to which 
the maxim of action should conform except the universality of a law as 
such; and it is only this conformity that the imperative asserts to be 
necessary (4:222). 
 
He concludes, “There is therefore only one categorical imperative and it is this: ‘Act only 
on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
                                                 
4It depends on one’s commitment to the end, since the end can be given up.  
5And his variation, the universal law of nature formulation, is “Act as though the maxim of your action 
were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (4:222). 
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law’” (4:222).  Let us note that this is the main passage from which Wood draws his 
interpretation of Kant’s argument.  Therefore, rather than interpreting the passage in 
detail here, we will discuss this argument in detail over the course of this paper.6   
 In order to understand Kant’s claim that we must act only on maxims that can 
become universal law (or, what is the same thing, can conform to universal law), we must 
first understand what it would take for a maxim to conform to the law, or to become a 
universal law.  A maxim is the principle on which an agent acts.  In a footnote, Kant 
writes,  
A maxim is a subjective principle of action and must be distinguished from 
an objective principle—namely, a practical law.  The former contains a 
practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions of 
the subject (often his ignorance or his inclinations); it is thus a principle on 
which the subject acts.  A law, on the other hand, is an objective principle, 
valid for every rational being; and it is a principle on which he ought to 
act—that is, an imperative (4:222). 
 
A worthy maxim, i.e. a maxim upon which it is morally permissible to act, is one in 
which the agent non-accidentally conforms to universal law.  But unworthy maxims 
could be anything from “I will steal this doughnut because I am hungry” (selfish maxim) 
to “I will replace her speech notes to thwart her career because it gives me pleasure” (evil 
maxim).  A maxim where one does the right action for the wrong reason (“I will rescue 
this baby from drowning for fame, honor and possibly a monetary reward”) is also 
unworthy.  According to what Kant says in the argument for FUL, the categorical 
imperative contains “the necessity that the maxim conform to the law,” (i.e. the 
categorical imperative expresses the necessity that our maxims can be willed as universal 
law— since the moral law applies to all rational beings, if our maxims cannot be willed 
                                                 
6However, my focus will be on the universal aspect of this argument.  Several other difficulties, while 
important, are outside the scope of this paper.  See, e.g. Hill’s “Analysis of Arguments,” 121-122. 
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as universal law, then these maxims will not conform to moral law,).  From this we can 
conclude that a maxim is morally permissible to act on if it is consistent with objective 
principles.7  Our maxims, then, need to be maxims that are valid for every rational being 
in order to be morally permissible to act on.8  Therefore, the categorical imperative 
asserts that we are to act only on maxims that can be willed to be universal law. 
 There are two ways that a maxim could fail to be able to be willed to be universal 
law.  The first way has to do with the coherence of the result when the maxim is willed to 
be universal law:  A maxim, when willed to be universal law, may result in a 
contradiction in conception (or a contradiction in nature, which is arguably the same).  
“Some actions are so constituted that we cannot even conceive without contradiction that 
their maxim be a universal law of nature, let alone that we could will that it ought to 
become one” (4:225). Kant thinks his examples of suicide and false-promising fail in this 
way.  The idea, roughly, is this:  Some maxims, if they were adopted as a universal law of 
nature, would result in a contradiction in the system of nature.  If we cannot conceive of a 
world in which it is universally permissible to act according to that maxim, then it is not 
morally permissible for an agent to act according to that maxim.   
The second way has to do with the willing:  A maxim, when an agent attempts to 
will it to be universal law, may result in a contradiction in the will of the agent.  In this 
kind of case, the will is committed to two opposing ends, and so when the agent wills for 
a maxim promoting one of these ends to be universal, while the will is still committed to 
                                                 
7I interpret maxims in such a way that in general we are testing whether they are universally permitted, 
although of course if we are never permitted not to act accordingly, then they would be universally 
required!  See, e.g. Hill, 69. 
8What “valid for all rational beings” consists in will vary significantly according to the interpretation of 
Kant.  For Wood, “valid for all rational beings” will turn out to mean something like, “all rational beings 
have the same necessary ground to act according to the principle.”  
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the other end, the result is a contradiction in the will.   “In the case of other actions, we do 
not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should 
be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict 
itself” (4:225).  Kant thinks the maxims in his examples of failing to develop a talent and 
failing to help others in need fail in this way.  So, perhaps the maxims in these cases 
could be adopted as a system of nature, but the agent could never will that they be 
adopted as a system of nature because it would result in a contradiction in the agent’s 
will.  If it is not possible for a rational being to will that the maxim should become a 
universal law (because that rational will would contradict itself due to conflicting 
necessary ends), then it is not morally permissible for an agent to act according to that 
maxim. 9 
Section 2: Wood’s objection 
 We will soon see that Wood objects to Kant’s argument that FUL is a formulation 
of the Categorical Imperative on the grounds that it is invalid (101).  We will see that his 
argument is that the conclusion of this argument (that the categorical imperative asserts 
that we are to act only on maxims that can be willed to be universal law) is not warranted 
by the premises.  Wood thinks that there could be some maxims that are valid for each 
rational being, and yet for which it is not rational for an agent to will as universal law.  It 
is one thing, he claims, for a maxim to be valid for each rational being, and quite another 
for it to be universalizable (for it to be rational for an agent to will it to be universal law).  
For example, he argues, it is rational for an egoist to adopt the principle of self-love 
                                                 
9This discussion of the argument has been vague on purpose.  Wood objects to this argument, and his 
objection will help us to introduce more precision into our understanding of Kant’s argument. 
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(always act to promote your own happiness) as a maxim, but it is not rational for him to 
will that all agents adopt the principle of self-love as a maxim.  He will conclude that the 
argument is fallacious. 
Before we consider Wood’s interpretation of this argument, we must first pause to 
consider some of his (and his understanding of Kant’s) terminology.  Reasons and 
grounds seem to be synonyms, for Wood.  A ground is just a reason, and although Wood 
does not elaborate on his understanding of reasons, his argument does not appear to 
depend on a controversial understanding of reasons.  A principle is meant to guide our 
action.  Maxims, which are the subjective principles of the will, are the principles we 
actually act on.10   
For Wood, objectively grounded principles are particularly crucial in Kant’s 
argument.  Objective principles, or objectively grounded principles, are the principles we 
should act on (i.e. we all have sufficient reason to act on them).11  An objectively 
grounded principle is a principle which all rational beings have a sufficient ground (a 
sufficient reason) to act on—and it must be the same ground for all rational beings.  This 
is the same, for Wood, as saying that it is universally valid.12  It must also be a necessary 
ground, i.e. an a priori necessity.  A principle on which I have one reason to act, and for 
                                                 
10For Wood, it is important that maxims articulate our grounds/reasons for action, although this may be 
controversial.  For the purposes of this paper, however, I will grant the point. 
11We act on an objective principle by bringing our subjective principle, i.e. our maxim, into accordance 
with the objective principle.   
12But see p.104, where he alludes to an ambiguity.  “Terms like ‘universally valid’ or ‘universally rational’ 
can be taken in either an individual sense or a collective sense.  If I say that a principle is ‘universally valid’ 
or ‘universally rational’, this might mean that for every individual without exception, the supremely 
rational course of conduct for that individual consists of his following that principle.  But it might also 
mean that any group of people in which the principle was universally followed would be a group whose 
behavior, considered collectively, is rational.”  Wood argues that this ambiguity leads to the fallacy in the 
argument we are considering.  
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which you have another ground, is not an objectively grounded principle, even if every 
rational being happens to have a ground to act on it.  
 I will reconstruct Kant’s argument, as Wood sees it, here. 
1. If there is a principle of morality, it is an objectively grounded principle.   
Wood writes, “What Kant wants to show about this principle of morality in his 
deduction of it is that it is a rational principle in the sense that every rational agent 
has some ground or reason for following it whatever the circumstances, and 
moreover a ground which is always rationally sufficient, decisive and overriding” 
(96).13 
 
2. An objectively grounded principle is one which all rational beings have not only 
reason/ground to act on, but the same (necessary) reason/ground to act on. 
 
“A practical principle is objective, or a practical law, if and only if there is a 
ground for following it which is necessarily valid for every rational being as 
such” (101). 
 
3. A maxim is objectively grounded (i.e. all agents have the same reason/ground to 
act on it; i.e. it is universally valid) if and only if it conforms to the concept of a 
principle which is objectively grounded. 
 
Wood writes, “But a ground of this kind cannot consist in anything except the 
agreement of the agent’s maxim with the concept of a principle which is 
universally valid” (101).   
 
In other words, a maxim conforms to law if and only if that maxim is objectively 
grounded; a maxim conforms to universal law if and only if we all share the same 
necessary reason/ground to act on it. 
 
4. A maxim is objectively grounded if and only if each rational being possesses a 
ground (a necessary ground, the same necessary ground) for acting on it.   
 
                                                 
13Here, Wood is speaking of Kant’s project as a whole (including Kant’s attempt to prove that there is a 
Categorical Imperative, in ch. 3), and he (Wood) is not specifically talking about the argument for FUL.  
Later, speaking of the argument for FUL as the first stage in a two-part project (the second stage being the 
attempt to prove that there is a Categorical Imperative), Wood writes, “First, Kant argues that the principle 
of morality is the only principle which agrees with the concept of an objective ground, so that this principle 
must be the foundation of every principle which is objectively grounded” (98).  
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This is intended as an attempt to fill out premise 3.  What it takes for a maxim to 
conform to the concept of a principle which is objectively grounded is for each 
rational being to have the same necessary ground for acting on it.14   
 
5. Therefore, a maxim is objectively grounded if and only if I can will it to be 
universally followed. 
 
Wood thinks the move from 4 to 5 (the conclusion) is fallacious.  In 4, the claim that a 
maxim is objectively grounded consists in claiming that I (a rational being) and every 
other rational being possess a ground for following that maxim (the ground is that the 
maxim conforms to law).  In 5, the claim is that I have a ground for willing that all 
rational beings follow that maxim.  Wood writes,  
The universal validity of an objective principle therefore consists solely in 
the fact that each rational being possesses a ground (the same ground) for 
following it.  But it does not necessarily consist, as Kant seems to infer, in 
the rational desirability (for someone, presumably for anyone at all) of the 
state of affairs which would result if everyone did follow this principle. 
 
And he continues, 
To put the matter more simply, Kant appears to be arguing from the 
premise that it is rational for each person to follow a certain principle, to 
the conclusion that it must be rational (for some person, or any person) to 
will that everyone follow this principle.  But this argument is not valid.  
For the fact that it is rational for each person to follow a certain principle 
does not, by itself, permit us any conclusion at all about the rational 
desirability of the state of affairs which would result if everyone followed 
it (101).  
 
The assertion is that there could (hypothetically, even) be maxims that all rational beings 
have grounds to follow, yet there are no grounds for willing these maxims to be universal 
                                                 
14Furthermore, Wood thinks that the objective ground is that all rational beings have a ground to act on the 
principle/maxim.  It is hard to see how to understand this claim so that it is not circular or infinitely 
regressive.  However, since Wood’s objection can be made without a commitment to this claim, I have set 
this issue aside. 
52 
  
law.  And the reason that there could be maxims which met one condition but not the 
other is that conceptually the conditions are different.15 
 Wood goes on to illustrate his objection with a counterexample.  If the inference 
from 4 to 5 is valid, Wood thinks, then there ought to be a contradiction in claiming of 
any principle both that it cannot be willed universally and that it is an objectively 
grounded principle.  And in his objection, Wood aims to present a case where there is not 
a contradiction in so claiming (and therefore the inference from 4 to 5 will be shown to 
be invalid, if the case is successful).  The idea is as follows: if the inference from 4 to 5 is 
legitimated by the meanings of the concepts involved (and according to Wood, Kant 
thinks it is), then any principle that meets the condition that it is an objectively grounded 
principle must (conceptually) meet the condition that it can be willed universally (and 
vice versa).  And there is a contradiction, therefore, in supposing that there could be a 
principle that meets one of these conditions but not the other.   
Wood’s counterexample is as follows: suppose there is an egoist, who claims that 
the principle of self-love, “Always seek your own happiness,” is an objective principle.  
He claims that it is an objective principle on the grounds that every rational being has the 
same (necessary) ground to follow the principle of self-love, “Always seek your own 
happiness.”  This egoist, however, cannot will this principle to be universally followed.  
He thinks “if everyone acted as (in the egoist’s opinion) he has an objective ground for 
                                                 
15Scarre nicely summarizes Wood’s objection as follows: “…Kant may simply have confused two quite 
different theses about practical reasoning.  The first of these theses is that rational agents will abide only by 
principles that are ‘universalizable’ in the very weak sense of being formally suitable for all rational agents; 
the second, that rational agents will abide only by principles that they are ‘able to will’ should be 
concurrently adopted by all other rational beings—i.e. principles that are universalizable in the stronger 




acting, the result would be the frustration of the egoist’s own desire for happiness, along 
with everyone else’s” (102).  Given that the result would be the frustration of the egoist’s 
own desire for happiness, the egoist agrees, in the end, that the principle of self-love, 
“Always seek your own happiness,” cannot be willed as universal law.  However, Wood 
claims, so far, we have been given no reason to think that the principle of self-love is not 
an objective principle.   
 The problem Wood is alluding to, in other words, is that the principle of self-love 
cannot be willed as a universal law, and therefore it is not the principle of morality.  
However, it is (by hypothesis) an objective principle.  For any principle, there ought to be 
a contradiction, if Kant is right, in maintaining that it is an objective principle and yet is 
incompatible with the principle of morality. We ought to have a contradiction, Wood 
thinks, but we don’t.  The problem isn’t just that we have a principle which is 
(supposedly) an objective principle, and yet one that cannot be willed as universal law.  
The problem, Wood thinks, is that, in this example, there is no contradiction in claiming 
that the principle of self-love is an objective principle.  Wood writes,  
Kant’s argument purports to show that the only possible objective ground, 
the only ground consistent with the concept of an objective ground, 
consists in the agreement of an agent’s maxim with the principle of 
morality, or the possibility of willing that this maxim be universally 
followed.  Hence if Kant’s argument were valid, it would be impossible to 
maintain without contradiction that the principle of self-love is an 
objective principle, since the principle of self-love, as we have supposed, 
is inconsistent with the principle of morality and cannot be willed as 
universal law.” (102-3.)   
 
The point here is that the principle of self-love, Wood thinks, has been demonstrated to 
be in disagreement with the principle of morality, since the principle of self-love cannot 
be willed to be universally followed.  Therefore, if we accept Kant’s argument, it is a 
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principle that is seemingly not consistent with the concept of an objective ground (since it 
is not consistent with the principle of morality).  But if that is true, then the principle of 
self-love cannot be an objective principle, for there would be a contradiction in 
maintaining that it is.  However, Wood claims, there is no such contradiction, and so we 
have reason to reject the move from 4 to 5.   
 It is important for Wood that the egoist cannot will that this principle of self-love 
be followed universally.  Wood’s language suggests that it is the egoist’s desire for 
happiness that prevents him from willing the principle of self-love to be universal law.  
He writes,  
The egoist concedes, then, that if everyone acted as (in the egoist’s 
opinion) he has an objective ground for acting, the result would be the 
frustration of the egoist’s own desire for happiness, along with everyone 
else’s.  The egoist must candidly admit, therefore, that he cannot will that 
everyone should follow the principle of self-love. (102)  
 
In the remaining part of this section, I will first demonstrate why, on Kant’s view, the 
egoist’s desires would not be able to play this role (standing in the way of the 
universalization of the principle of self-love).  I will then suggest how we can plausibly 
understand Wood’s objection without this mistaken view of Kant (whether it is how 
Wood intended it or not).   
 On Kant’s theory, desire-frustration cannot be the sole obstacle to a principle’s 
being willed as universal law.  We know that Kant thinks that if a maxim cannot be 
willed to be a universal law, the failure must be due to a contradiction (either in the will 
or in nature) that would result if it were willed universally.  Kant writes,  
Some actions are so constituted that we cannot even conceive without 
contradiction that their maxim be a universal law of nature, let alone that 
we could will that it ought to become one.  In the case of other actions, we 
do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that 
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their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, 
because such a will would contradict itself (4:225). 
 
But clearly there is no contradiction in willing something (universally or otherwise) that 
would frustrate my desires.  For example, “I will that my desires be frustrated” is not 
contradictory in the least.  Desires, for Kant, are not part of the will; therefore it is 
difficult to see how they could lead to a contradiction in the will.  The contradiction can 
only result if I have adopted the object of what I desire as an end.  This is because ends 
are set by the will—and therefore an end is the only kind of thing that can lead to a 
contradiction in the will. 
 However, even having adopted the object of a desire as an end is not enough to 
result in the contradiction in the will.  It would be quite implausible of Kant to claim that 
all contingent ends must remain contradiction-free when evaluating whether a maxim 
could be willed universally.  Contingent ends are the proper subject of hypothetical 
imperatives, not categorical imperatives.  A frivolous example will help demonstrate the 
point.  Suppose that I (as someone with a sweet-tooth) have adopted as an end that I will 
refrain from eating candy today, even when I desperately want to.  If any end will be 
included in an evaluation of whether the maxim could be willed universally, given that I 
have adopted this end, I would be unable to will “I will eat candy when I want it” to be 
universally permitted, because that would result in a contradiction in my will.  However, 
Kant surely does not want to say that it is impermissible for us to eat candy when we 
want it, just because I happen to have set as an end for myself that I will not eat candy.16  
                                                 
16There is still something wrong with me, however, something irrational!  If I were to act on a maxim that, 
when willed to be universally followed, resulted in a contradiction in my contingent ends, I would be doing 
something irrational.  Perhaps it could be said that I lack integrity.  However, the accusation cannot be, if 
made solely on the contradiction in my contingent ends, that I violate the categorical imperative.   
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And, given the diversity of contingent ends among all rational beings, if all contingent 
ends were included in evaluations, we would have very restrictive limitations on action, 
and it is hard to see how in this case we could ever act without violating the categorical 
imperative!   
Rather, for Kant, what matters for evaluating a maxim according to FUL is 
whether there are rationally necessary ends that would prevent the maxim from being 
willed as universal law.  For example, in his discussion of the man who does not want to 
develop his talent, Kant writes, “For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his 
powers should be developed, since they are after all useful to him and given to him for all 
sorts of possible purposes” (4:224, emphasis mine).  Contingent ends that are not shared 
by all rational beings cannot form the basis of a categorical imperative.17,18   
 Let us now consider how we may understand Wood’s counterexample so that it 
does not depend on desire-frustration or on a contingent end (and so that he may 
                                                 
17If all contingent ends must be considered in deciding which maxims could be willed as universal law, we 
would get different answers depending on who was testing the maxim.  I, as someone who has willed not to 
eat candy, could not will that those who want candy shall eat it to be a universal law, whereas plausibly 
someone who has not willed to avoid candy could will that those who want candy shall eat it to be a 
universal law. 
18This may seem controversial.  For example, suppose I have a contingent end that not everyone could 
pursue—e.g. suppose my contingent end is to eat cookies (every cookie I see, even when it belongs to 
someone else).  It seems plausible that my maxim (“I will eat every cookie I see, even when it belongs to 
someone else”) would result in a contradiction in my will, since other people may try to take my cookies 
from me when they want them.  In this case, my contingent end is what prevents my maxim from being 
willed to be universal law, and this may seem to be a counterexample to the position I have been arguing.  
But there is an important difference between this cookie case and the case I described earlier, where I adopt 
the end of refraining from eating candy, but this end does not thereby mean that eating candy cannot be 
willed to be universal law.  It is the difference between the mere fact of a contingent end being an end 
preventing a maxim from being willed to be universal law (what I have been arguing against, using the 
candy as my example) and the contradiction in one’s will when a person holds that he should be allowed to 
pursue a contingent end where no one else should be able to (the cookie case, where contingent ends are 
relevant).  What’s bring universalized in the cookie case is a maxim based on a contingent end, but the 
origin of the contradiction is not in the contingent end, but in the exception that the person is making for 
himself.  In contrast, using the candy case, I have been arguing that the origin of the contradiction cannot 
be the contingent end itself. 
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plausibly be able to claim that the principle of self-love cannot be willed to be a universal 
law).  By hypothesis, the principle of self-love (“Always seek your own happiness”) is an 
objective principle.  I will assume, as seems plausible, that the assumption behind the 
principle of self-love is that each person’s own happiness is something that each rational 
being (by hypothesis, given that the principle of self-love is an objective principle) has 
the same ground for seeking.   
The contradiction in willing the principle of self-love to be a universal law would 
be that in doing what he has objective grounds to do he thereby frustrates his own ends 
(he cannot achieve his ends, because in seeking them he would thereby frustrate them).  
By willing that each agent seek his own happiness, the egoist would thereby thwart his 
own end of seeking his own happiness. That contradiction is why the egoist cannot will 
the principle of self-love to be followed universally, and why it thereby cannot be the 
principle of morality.  If, by trying to will what he has objective ground to will, he 
thereby frustrates the very thing he has objective ground to will, then it is not possible to 
will the principle of self-love to be universal law.19  If Wood is correct in his 
interpretation of Kant, then he seems to have provided a successful counterexample to 
Kant’s argument for FUL.20    
                                                 
19This example assumes that the principle of self-love is an objective principle on the basis of the 
objectivity of the end of happiness.  However, it seems possible that the (hypothetical) objectivity of the 
end of happiness is better captured by some other practical principle.  Perhaps there is another principle that 
is grounded in the end of happiness that actually could be willed to be universal law.  Wood does not 
consider this possibility, but it seems relevant to the example.  
20It is somewhat unclear whether Wood intends the violation of the categorical imperative to be a 
contradiction in the will of the egoist, or whether the result is a contradiction in conception/nature.  The 
case’s striking resemblance to Kant’s example of the impermissibility of false promising suggests that it is 
a contradiction in conception/nature.  However, Wood’s own discussion, while not taking a clear stand, 
sometimes suggests that he thinks it is a contradiction in the will of the egoist.  (E.g., Wood writes that the 
problem is the frustration of the egoists own desires.) 
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 At this point, I think we need to step back interpretively.  Wood thinks that Kant 
has taken advantage of an invalid inference, thereby undermining his argument for FUL.  
Wood argues that Kant has failed to recognize a difference between claiming that each 
rational being possesses a ground for following a maxim and claiming that I have a 
ground for willing that all rational beings follow that maxim.  However, I believe that the 
source of the invalidity is in reading the argument as if it concerned our reasons or 
grounds for acting on maxims.  As an alternative, I propose that we should view Kant’s 
argument in FUL as solely concerned with the universal form of the categorical 
imperative.  Kant introduces reasons and grounds when he introduces the Humanity 
Formulation, not when he argues for FUL.  There are several benefits of this 
interpretation, not least of which is that it avoids reading Kant as taking advantage of an 
invalid inference.  However, it is difficult to express this point in the language of Wood’s 
interpretation.  Therefore, in the next section I would like to delineate a different 
approach to understanding Kant’s argument. 
Section 3: O’Neill’s interpretation 
I want to propose in this section that if one interprets Kant in such a way that he is 
not concerned with the grounds that agents have for acting on FUL in his argument for 
FUL, then it is no longer natural to interpret Kant as failing to recognize the difference 
between a case where it is rational for each person to will a maxim to be universal law 
and a case where it is rational for each person to will that everyone will this maxim (and 
we can call these, as Scarre does, the weaker and the stronger senses, respectively, of 
universalizability).  Wood mistakes Kant to be offering the stronger thesis in the 
conclusion of FUL because he takes Kant to be making claims about what agents have 
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grounds to do in his argument for FUL.  We should focus our energies on interpreting 
Kant in such a way that he sidesteps this problem.  Later in this section, I will consider 
O’Neill’s interpretation, which I will argue succeeds in sidestepping the problem, even 
while it is subject to other difficulties.  
 At this point, then, I would like to step back briefly and reevaluate the assumption 
that Kant’s argument in FUL involves any claims about what agents have grounds to do 
in his argument for FUL.  Even Wood would agree that Kant does not explicitly use the 
word “ground” in that argument.  Since Kant does not use the word “ground” (or reason, 
or any other obvious synonym) in the argument for FUL, the interpretive burden is 
(prima facie at least) on Wood.  While Kant clearly takes grounds for action seriously in 
the argument for the humanity formulation, I will argue that in the FUL argument, for 
Kant, grounds are not yet relevant.  
 I will argue that Wood misinterprets the imperative as given in FUL when he 
takes it to be more content-ful than the preceding premise.21  The conclusion of the 
argument to establish that FUL formulates the supreme principle of morality is not that 
all rational beings must have grounds to will that the maxim become universally 
followed.  Kant’s ultimate point, rather, is that the only kind of maxim that could 
conform to universal law (i.e. that could be necessarily valid for all rational beings) is a 
maxim that applied to all of us.  The moral law is universal, and therefore any maxim that 
                                                 
21Remember, the preceding premise, to paraphrase Wood’s interpretation, is “A maxim is objectively 
grounded if and only if each rational being possesses a ground (a necessary ground, the same necessary 
ground) for acting on it.”  The conclusion, to paraphrase Wood’s interpretation, is “Therefore, a maxim is 
objectively grounded if and only if I can will it to be universally followed.” 




is not universal cannot express moral law.  For Kant, we only begin to consider our 
grounds for acting when we have moved on to the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, the humanity formulation.  Our grounds for acting are not relevant when we 
are merely considering what conditions will allow us to discover which maxims have the 
proper form, a universal form, so that they can apply to all of us and therefore satisfy the 
most basic moral requirement, that moral requirements apply equally to all of us.  The 
categorical imperative as given in FUL is meant to provide necessary (but not sufficient) 
criteria for the proper form of a maxim that conforms to universal law. 
For now, let us consider an interpretation that will give us some insight as to how 
we can avoid interpreting Kant as making an invalid inference.  The key to such an 
interpretation is to understand Kant’s argument as proceeding in two stages, one given in 
his argument for FUL and one given in his argument for FH.  The first stage is the stage 
where Kant discusses the necessary conditions for the proper form of maxims (he gives 
necessary conditions for determining which maxims are permissible, but not sufficient 
conditions).  However, FUL is not by itself sufficient to determine moral law.  As we 
have already seen, for Kant, rationally necessary ends are the only ends relevant for 
determining whether a maxim would result in a contradiction in the will.  But until we 
know what ends are rationally necessary, we cannot know which maxims can be willed to 
be universal law.  (We will learn later that the only rationally necessary end, according to 
Kant, is humanity.)  FUL and FH are each necessary and jointly sufficient for 
determining which maxims are morally permissible.22  It is in the second stage that we 
                                                 
22For an example of an opposing view, that the universal law formulation should “generate moral laws that 
are…independent of empirical premises such as…human ends” (p.403), see Richard Francis Galvin, 
“Ethical Formalism: The Contradiction in Conception Test,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, v.8:4, 
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learn how these conditions can be applied, once we know what the rationally necessary 
end (humanity) is.  But even in such an interpretation, it is important to be able to explain 
how these two formulations are complementary to each other.   
O’Neill offers just such an interpretation of the Formulation of Universal Law 
(FUL) and the Humanity Formulation (FH, which she refers to as FEI, for “the Formula 
of the End-In-Itself”), in “Universal Laws and Ends-in-Themselves.” Her interpretation 
emphasizes parallels between FUL and FEI/FH.  FUL, on her view, is meant to help us 
find maxims that are compatible with the agency of all whom they would govern, and 
FEI emphasizes the value of the agency of all rational beings.  While in the end I will 
argue that O’Neill’s interpretation does not succeed, she makes great progress towards 
avoiding the objection that Wood gives, and so her interpretation will be instructive to 
us.23 
Her argument can be understood as proceeding in two stages.  We will first 
consider O’Neill’s claim of equivalence between the FUL requirement that we be able to 
conceive that a maxim is universally permissible and the FEI requirement that we never 
treat rational beings as mere means.  We will then consider her claim that the FUL 
requirement that we (as rational beings) be able to will that a maxim is universally 
permissible is equivalent to the FEI requirement that we treat other rational beings as 
ends. 
                                                                                                                                                 
October 1991.  The disagreement here is over the degree to which we should expect support from FH to 
generate contradictions in our maxims and Galvin appears to think we do not need such support. 
23I should note that in some of her other works, O’Neill seems less inclined to emphasize the parallels 
between the two formulations.  See, e.g. Onora O’Neill, “Consistency in Action”, Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, ed. P. Guyer. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1998, 
pp.103-131.  However, my aim here is to see how the lesson can be applied to help rescue Kant from 
Wood’s objection.   
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 O’Neill begins by considering the FUL’s condition that we must be able to 
conceive that a maxim is universally permissible, if it is to conform to the categorical 
imperative.  She writes,  
Maxims which violate strict duties are said to yield contradictions in 
conception if we try to universalize them: the very attempt to think of the 
maxim as universally adopted breaks down owing to some incoherence in 
the way the world would have to be if it was universally acted on (347).   
 
For example, as she points out, a maxim of deceit is a maxim that would yield a 
contradiction in conception (or, what is arguably the same thing, a contradiction in 
nature).  In order to deceive someone about x, that person must trust you (at least about 
x), yet permitting universal deceit would thereby make that sort of trust impossible 
(assuming that deceit would be frequent if permitted).  Therefore, a maxim of deceit is 
the sort of thing that could not be universally permitted, for it would only prevent its own 
possibility if universally permitted.   
O’Neill argues that violence is a similar case.  She argues that it also is the sort of 
thing that cannot be permitted according to FUL, since any maxim that permits violence 
will result in a contradiction in conception/nature.  She claims that violence against a 
victim undercuts the agency of the victim.  Without agency, however, the victim is 
unable to will the maxims that permit the violence against them in the first place.  
Therefore, when we try to will maxims permitting violence as universal law, a 
contradiction in conception/nature results.  She writes, 
However, both instrumental and brute violence undercut the agency of 
those whom they victimize.  It is not merely that victims do not in fact will 
the maxims of their destroyers and coercers:  they are deliberately made 
unable to do so, or unable to do so for some period of time.  A test that 
demands action only on maxims that all can adopt will require that action 




Since a victim’s agency is compromised (destroyed or damaged or restricted), the victim 
cannot will the maxim permitting the victimizing action, O’Neill claims.  It is the very 
loss of agency that prevents the victim from willing the maxim to be universal law 
(agency is a precondition for exercising the will).  And since the victim is unable to will 
the maxim, it straightforwardly follows that the maxim cannot be willed to be universal 
law.24  
More generally, O’Neill believes that protecting agency is a precondition for 
universalizability.  She writes,  
Self-sufficiency is an incoherent goal for finite rational beings; at most 
they can coherently aim to minimize their dependence on others.  They 
cannot universalize maxims either of refusing to accept any help or of 
refusing to offer any help, since help may be needed for the survival of 
their agency (348). 
 
An agent cannot universalize maxims that undermine his agency, due to resulting 
contradictions in his will.  Pogge objects to this claim on the following grounds:   
But then, by the same token, I would have to will the use of all other 
(permissible) means, such as flattery or begging, if my ends should turn 
out to be unattainable without them.  Yet this is patently false, as I can 
reasonably will to get along without flattery, begging, or unpaid help.  The 
flaw in this argument is this: Even if it is necessary that agents have ends, 
it is not necessary that we have this or that particular end.  Thus it is 
possible for us to renounce certain means, by resolving to pursue only 
ends attainable without them (210-11, N19).25   
 
Of course, it is crucial to keep in mind that for Kant, it is necessary for us to have one 
particular end, namely, the end articulated in the humanity formulation: agency, rational 
nature, humanity.  While any contingent end may be given up, we as agents cannot give 
                                                 
24O’Neill believes that this is a case where willing would result in a contradiction in conception, but I will 
argue later that this rather is a case where willing would result in a contradiction in the will. 
25Thomas Pogge, “The Categorical Imperative”, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical 
Essays, ed. P. Guyer. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1998. 
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up the end of protecting agency.  O’Neill’s point, I think, is that we may need others’ 
help to remain agents.  Pogge misses that the very survival of one’s agency is not a 
merely contingent end that can be given up.  
 For O’Neill, maxims that permit compromising an agent’s agency (by destroying 
it, damaging it, or restricting it) result in contradictions in conception when one attempts 
to will them to be universal law.  Maxims that permit agents never to help other agents 
(maxims that permit what she calls “self-sufficiency”) result in contradictions in the will 
when one attempts to will them to be universal law. O’Neill moves on to consider the 
parallel argument against victimization, using FEI/FH.   
In using FUL to test our maxims we check that those maxims could be 
acted on by all other agents; in using FEI to test our maxims we check that 
action on them disables no other agents from adopting them (354). 
 
On her interpretation, treating another as a mere means (as opposed to treating him as an 
end) is to interfere with his agency.  She writes, 
If we treat other agents as mere means, we do prevent, damage or restrict 
their agency….  It is not merely that we may act in ways to which they do 
not consent; we act on maxims to which they could not consent (353).   
 
O’Neill emphasizes that treating another agent as a mere means thwarts that person’s 
own agency.  And thwarting his agency, as we saw, acts as a roadblock to willing a given 
maxim as a universal law.  To see the parallel between FEI/FH and FUL, we only need to 
see that when we treat another as a mere means, and act on maxims to which he could not 
consent, we act on maxims that would result in a contradiction in conception/nature when 
willed to be universal law.  She writes, 
To use another as a mere means, as Kant sees it, is to act on a maxim 
which the other cannot also adopt.  This amounts to acting on a maxim 




And to fail to treat another as an end, on this view, commits one (rationally) to self-
sufficiency—it is to attempt to act on maxims that permit failing to help other agents.  
Such a maxim would result in a contradiction in the will when willed to be universal law, 
since, for O’Neill, we cannot rationally will to be self-sufficient.   
 The force of Wood’s counterexample derives from the alleged compatibility of 
the propositions, 1) The principle of self-love is an objective principle and 2) The 
principle of self-love is incompatible with the principle of morality.  Kant’s argument 
implies that the two should be contradictory, so if they are compatible then Kant’s 
argument has failed.  While we are not quite in a position to defend Kant against this 
counterexample yet, we have the material to see how, using O’Neill’s interpretation, we 
can begin to develop a contradiction between 1) and 2).26  While 1) and 2) may not seem, 
prima facie to be contradictory, we know that for Kant, there must be a reason why the 
principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of morality.  Understanding 
why the principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of morality is what will 
generate a contradiction between 1) and 2).  On O’Neill’s interpretation, the reason that 
self-love is not consistent with the principle of morality must be something like, “We 
must never damage another’s agency, and we must help the agency of others when we 
can.”  Agency is the objective end, the rationally necessary end, on her view.  The 
principle of self-love, however, requires choosing actions that further one’s own ends, not 
choosing actions on the grounds that they further another’s ends.  But if this is true, then 
                                                 
26And from the get-go, we can see that she is opposed to Wood’s style of interpreting Kant:  “[FUL] is 
often misconstrued as a claim that morally worthy maxims must be ones that we are willing, i.e. want to see 
universally adopted….  This may not be such deep died heteronomy as a Utilitarian pursuit of maximal 
satisfaction of desires; but it is heteronomy nonetheless, and Kant rejects it decisively” (346). See also her 
article “Consistency in Action”, pp.103-131.  Wood’s interpretation is not necessarily heteronymous, but at 
the least it does make a similar mistake—that whether a maxim can be willed universally depends on what 
is in the agent’s best interest.   
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self-love (happiness) is not an objective end, and therefore the principle of self-love is not 
an objective principle.27  Developing a contradiction between 1) and 2) requires simply 
showing why 2) is true.  Understanding why 2) is true will show us why 1) must be false.   
 Let us put the point in a slightly different way.  We begin with the following two 
claims, which Wood claims are not contradictory:   
1) The principle of self-love is an objective principle  
2) The principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of morality.   
We can then ask the following question: Why is the principle of self-love not compatible 
with the principle of morality?  Why can it not be willed to be universal law?  O’Neill’s 
answer will be that agency, not happiness, is the objective end, the end that is rationally 
necessary for all rational beings.  Only maxims that are compatible with treating agency 
as an objective end can pass the universalizability test.  Furthermore, we can plausible 
say that if agency is the objective end, then happiness cannot be the objective end.28  
Therefore, if agency is the objective end, then the principle of self-love is not an 
objective principle.  
Let us return, with a critical eye, to O’Neill’s argument that maxims that rely on 
victimizing are incoherent when universally permitted.29  It is true that the actions taken 
                                                 
27I assume here that there can be only one unqualified objective end.  Kant must have had something like 
this in mind, though, for if there are two unqualified objective ends, they potentially could conflict, which 
would undermine Kant’s claim that we must always act to promote the objective end, and never undermine 
it.  Therefore, I assume, if agency is an objective end, happiness thereby cannot be an objective end. 
28 Again, I am assuming here that there can be only one unqualified objective end. 
29I do agree with O’Neill that violence cannot be universally permitted, and that Kant has good reason to 
maintain that violence is not permitted according to the categorical imperative.  However, my reason for 
thinking that (for Kant) violence cannot be universally permitted is that humanity, rational nature, agency, 
is an objective end.  Without knowing that humanity is an objective end, I do not see why it is incoherent to 
suppose that maxims permitting violence, i.e. maxims where the victimizer articulates his intention to 
compromise or destroy another’s humanity or agency for his own gain or pleasure, are universally 
permitted.  More on this point later. 
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by the victimizer, should he act on such a maxim, would undercut or destroy the agency 
of the victim.  It is this fact, in part, that makes being victimized so frustrating and 
demoralizing.  However, the loss of agency involved in victimization occurs only after 
the victimization has taken place.  Remember, O’Neill’s claim was that maxims 
involving victimization cannot be willed as universal law since the victim cannot will 
anything, including that the maxim be universal law (and therefore these maxims, when 
we try to universalize them, result in a contradiction in conception/nature).  Her argument 
requires that the very loss of agency is what prevents the victim from willing the maxim 
to be universal law.  Let us note that if it is not the loss of agency that prevents the victim 
from willing the maxim to be universal law, then the result would not be a contradiction 
in conception/nature.  At most, we would have a contradiction in the will. 
However, in cases of victimization, the victim’s agency is undercut or destroyed 
only once the maxim has been acted on.  There is no incoherence (even if there is 
implausibility) in supposing that the victim could will the maxim to be universal law 
before his agency has been undermined.30  As a contrast case, consider Kant’s claim that 
maxims permitting lying would result in a contradiction in conception.  In that case, the 
very possibility of lying depends on trust; however, there could be no trust in a world 
where lying was permitted.31  Kant thinks that the very idea of a world where lying is 
permitted is for this reason incoherent.  In the case of victimization, there is no such 
contradiction.  The fact that agency would break down later (after the maxim has been 
                                                 
30Consider Sophie, in “Sophie’s Choice”, for example, to illustrate the point that there is no incoherence in 
wishing that one’s agency be taken away.  Conceivably, she could take steps to undermine her agency in 
order to avoid making the choice. 
31I do not here mean to imply that all lying is impermissible.  But where lying is impermissible, Kant’s 
view seems to be that it is impermissible because lying in such situations would not be possible if everyone 
did it—because we would no longer trust each other in those situations, and lying depends on such trust.  
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acted on) is not sufficient to make the world in which victimization is permitted 
incoherent unless agency is an objective end.  (Remember, we saw earlier that contingent 
ends are not sufficient to prevent a maxim from being universalizable.  Only rationally 
required ends, that is, objective ends, are relevant when deciding which maxims can meet 
the conditions set by the universal law formulation.)  But if it is true that there is no 
incoherence in a world where the victim wills the maxim to be universal law, then the 
contradiction must derive from the fact that agency is a rationally required end.  It is a 
contradiction in the will of the victim that stands in the way of maxims allowing 
victimization to be willed as universal law. 
 In her discussion of FEI and imperfect duties, O’Neill writes that Kant thinks that 
agency is so fragile that merely forbidding actions that assault agency (treat other rational 
beings as mere means) is not sufficient to protect it.  For her interpretation, agency is the 
key in connecting these two formulations.  She explains, 
In using FUL to test our maxims we check that those maxims could be 
acted on by all other agents; in using FEI to test our maxims we check that 
action on them disables no other agents from adopting them (354). 
 
The equivalence of treating others as ends-in-themselves and of acting on 
maxims that can pass the contradiction in the will test is based on the fact 
that both principles express that agency be secured for all (355). 
 
As we saw earlier, however, while acting on a maxim may disable another agent from 
consenting to that maxim, it is quite another thing to say that the maxim in question could 
not be consented to by that very agent.  All it shows is that he could not consent to it at a 
particular time (namely, after he had been victimized).   
 The problem, ultimately, is that on O’Neill’s account, we only succeed in ruling 
out maxims which permit violence or assaults on agency on the grounds that they result 
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in a contradiction in the will, not that they result in a contradiction in conception/nature.  
If my claim that there is no incoherence (even if there is implausibility) is supposing that 
the victim could will the maxim to be universal law before his agency has been 
undermined is true, then we must believe that the reason a maxim allowing victimization 
cannot be universalized is because it results in a contradiction in the will of an agent 
when that agent attempts to will it to be universal law.  We can conceive of a maxim 
allowing victimization (by those who are willing) being universal law—what prevents it 
from passing the test given by FUL is that we cannot will it without contradicting the 
rationally required end of protecting agency, our own and that of others.  
In this section, we saw that one way around Wood’s argument may be to see that 
the FUL and the FH formulations are importantly different—with FUL focusing on the 
form of appropriate maxims, and FH focusing on the development of an objective end.  
Once we interpret Kant in such a way that the grounds are not given in FUL, but come 
later in FH, we can see that Kant’s argument will not be invalid in the way Wood 
supposes.  O’Neill’s argument was an interpretation very much in this spirit, and as such 
it made headway on how we should understand Kant in order to circumvent the 
objection.  However, because of details in O’Neill’s argument, I concluded that her 
interpretation ultimately did not succeed.  In the next section, I will offer an interpretation 
of Kant that will build on her account while also sidestepping her difficulties. 
Section 4: Interpreting Kant 
We can take O’Neill’s interpretation as a model for avoiding Wood’s objection, 
but in doing so it will be important to understand Kant in such a way that we avoid the 
main difficulty facing her interpretation.  In this section, I will outline my own 
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interpretation.  It is my hope that this interpretation will provide us with the necessary 
equipment to illustrate how Kant can avoid the difficulties posed by Wood’s objection.  I 
will take a significant cue from O’Neill, while also trying to improve upon the progress 
she has made.  I will start from the beginning, so that it is clear at each step exactly what I 
take Kant to be doing. 
 As we saw earlier, Kant gives two conditions that a maxim must meet in order for 
that maxim to conform to law, i.e. in order for that maxim to conform to the categorical 
imperative as expressed in FUL.  The first condition is that we must be able to conceive 
of a world in which it is universally permissible to act according to that maxim.32  “Some 
actions are so constituted that we cannot even conceive without contradiction that their 
maxim be a universal law of nature, let alone that we could will that it ought to become 
one” (4:225). Kant thinks his examples of suicide and false-promising fail in this way.  
The idea, roughly, is this:  Some maxims, if they were adopted as a universal law of 
nature, would result in a contradiction in the system of nature.  If we cannot conceive of a 
world in which it is universally permissible to act according to that maxim, then it is not 
morally permissible for an agent to act according to that maxim.33  For Kant, the 
                                                 
32Again, I assume here that maxims are universally permitted, although they would be required if the 
maxim’s negation was never permitted. 
33One might wonder what exactly makes such a maxim fail—is it that A) it could not be a law of nature?  
Or, is it instead that B) we could not will it to be a law of nature, because we could not conceive of it being 
a law of nature?  In other words, the question is about what, ultimately, the source of the failure is—is it the 
incoherence of the possibility that it be universal law, or does the failure reside in our inability to conceive 
that it could be universal law. I don’t have the space here to consider this issue in great detail, but it will 
suffice to gesture at the possibilities. To B), the interpretation that we could not will it to be a law of nature 
without a contradiction in conception, one might object that someone could, out of ignorance, fail to realize 
that willing it universally would result in a contradiction of nature.  Kant could reply by claiming that there 
are conditions of success in conceiving, or even actually willing, and that in these cases, we are not actually 
conceiving or willing universally, but we only think we are.  This strategy could be more plausible, or less, 
depending on the details, but the important thing to note is that even if the reason the maxim fails is because 
we cannot will it to be a universal law of nature, the reason we cannot will it (or conceive it) to be so is still 
because it could not be a law of nature.  (The only other natural response is that we do will the maxim to be 
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distinction between, on the one hand, cases concerning maxims that, willed universally, 
result in a contradiction in the system of nature or in conception and, on the other hand, 
cases concerning maxims that result in a contradiction in the will (and we will discuss the 
latter sort of cases shortly) lines up with the distinction between strict or narrow (perfect) 
duty and wide or meritorious (imperfect) duty.  “We see readily that the first kind of 
action is opposed to strict or narrow duty, the second opposed to wide (meritorious) duty” 
(4:225).   
 The point here, contra Wood, is that if we cannot conceive of a world where such 
a maxim is universally permissible, then it cannot be universally permissible in this world 
(since, of course, this world is not only conceivable but actual).  It would be 
inconceivable for this maxim to be universally permissible, by hypothesis.  Again, the 
moral law applies universally to all rational beings.  If a maxim is such that it cannot 
apply universally to all rational beings, then that maxim cannot conform to the law.  
Wood argued that Kant failed to recognize the difference between a case where it is 
rational for each person to will a maxim to be universal law and a case where it is rational 
for each person to will that everyone will this maxim.  But on this interpretation, there is 
                                                                                                                                                 
a universal law, but that it cannot be a law of nature, which is just A).)  Therefore, the ultimate explanation 
for either A) or B) will be that the maxim could not be a law of nature.  The ultimate condition of success 
for a maxim in these sorts of cases would be that it could be adopted as a system of nature, and the ultimate 
condition of failure is that it could not be adopted as a system of nature.  The only difference is that on one 
interpretation, there is the intermediate step whereby the maxim must not be able to be willed to be a law of 
nature.  I should note that each interpretation has support in the text.  For B): “Some actions are so 
constituted that we cannot even conceive without contradiction that their maxim be a universal law of 
nature, let alone that we could will that it ought to become one” (4:225).   For A), consider Kant’s 
discussion of why the maxims in his suicide and false promising cases each fail:  e.g. (false-promising), “I 
then see immediately that this maxim can never qualify as a self-consistent universal law of nature, but 





no stronger or weaker sense of universalizability.  There is only the one sense of 
universalizability—that a maxim can possibly be universally followed.  And therefore the 
inference (from the fact that it is rational for each person to will a maxim to be universal 
law to the fact that it is rational for each person to will that everyone will this maxim) that 
Wood thought he saw in Kant’s argument is avoided.  We will see later, in section V, 
below, how to address Wood’s counterexample, and to develop a contradiction between 
the two claims that Wood argued should be contradictory if Kant is right, but which 
Wood believes are not contradictory. 
 The second condition provided by FUL is that we (each of us as a rational being) 
must be able to will that the maxim should become a universal law (of permission).   
In the case of other actions, we do not find this inner impossibility, but it 
is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the 
universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself 
(4:225).   
Kant thinks the maxims in his examples of failing to develop a talent and failing to help 
others in need fail in this way.  So, perhaps the maxims in these cases could be adopted as 
a system of nature, but the agent could never will that they be adopted as a system of 
nature because it would result in a contradiction in the agent’s will.  If it is not possible 
for a rational being to will that the maxim should become a universal law of permission 
(because that rational will would contradict itself due to conflicting necessary ends) then 
it is not morally permissible for an agent to act according to that maxim.34 
                                                 
34One might wonder whether, analogously to the problem raised earlier, we can be mistaken about whether 
willing a maxim to be a universal law of nature would result in a contradiction in our will.  That is, just as it 
seems possible not to know whether a maxim, if it were to become a law of nature, would result in a 
contradiction in the system of nature, it seems possible not to know (at least, at a given time) that willing a 
maxim to be a universal law of nature would result in a contradiction.  While it does seem impossible to 
will x and not-x at the same time, it seem somewhat more possible to will contradictorily when the 
contradiction is less obvious, such as in Kant’s examples.  And, therefore, some maxims that would result 
in a contradiction in the will could still be willed to be universal law, if the agent was ignorant of the 
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 The point here, again contra Wood, is that if I cannot will a maxim that would 
result in a contradiction of my will (rooted in a rationally necessary end) to be universally 
permitted, then it cannot be valid for every rational being.  The contradiction in the will 
will always be rooted in a rationally necessary end, that is, an end that all rational beings 
necessarily share.  If I cannot will the maxim to be universally followed, because of that 
rationally necessary end, then that maxim cannot possibly be valid for every rational 
being.   
 Until we know more, however, it is quite difficult to apply FUL.  For one thing, in 
the absence of any knowledge about what the rationally necessary ends are, it is difficult 
to know which maxims a rational being would be able to will universally without 
contradicting his own will.   In order to make progress following his discussion of FUL, 
therefore, Kant moves on to discuss the possibility of an objective end, that is, an end that 
has absolute worth.  If there is a categorical imperative, Kant thinks, there must be an 
objective end that forms the ground of the imperative.  (Relative ends, i.e. ends that are 
not objective but rather depend on an agent’s having chosen them, are only able to 
support hypothetical imperatives.)  He writes,  
For if this were not so, [if rational beings did not have absolute value as an 
objective end], there would be nothing at all having absolute value 
anywhere.  But if all value were conditional, and thus contingent, then no 
supreme principle could be found for reason at all (4:229). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
contradiction.  Kant could reject this possibility, he could claim that there are conditions of success in 
willing, and so we are not actually willing universally when willing so results in a contradiction, or he 
could claim that we successfully will them to be universal law, but it results in a contradiction, and so the 
reason it fails the test is because it results in a contradiction in the will.  However, whichever he chooses, 
the ultimate condition of success for a maxim of this sort is that it does not result in a contradiction in the 




And so, if there is a categorical imperative, there must be something with absolute value, 
or else there could not be a categorical imperative, which of course is not possible given 
the (assumed but not yet proven) antecedent condition. 
 Kant postulates that there is an objective end35, and that the objective end is 
rational nature (also sometimes referred to as humanity, or agency).  Rational nature is 
an objective end, Kant thinks, but furthermore it is something that we must regard as an 
objective end.  He writes, “Suppose, however, there were something whose existence in 
itself had an absolute worth, something that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of 
definite laws” (4:228).  He continues, “Now, I say, a human being, and in general every 
rational being, does exist as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be used by this or 
that will as it pleases” (4:229). Kant here emphasizes that a rational being is an objective 
end, that is, each rational being is an end-in-itself.   
 But he continues, later, saying, “In all his actions, whether they are directed to 
himself or to other rational beings, a human being must always be viewed at the same 
time as an end” (4:229, bold emphasis mine). “Rational nature exists as an end in itself.  
This is the way in which a human being necessarily conceives his own existence, and it is 
therefore a subjective principle of human actions” (4:229).  In these latter two passages, 
Kant’s emphasis is on how rational nature must be viewed by rational beings.36   
                                                 
35Although, of course, we cannot know this until we have proven that there is a categorical imperative, 
which must wait until Kant’s chapter 3, “Final Step from a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure 
Practical Reason”, which is outside the scope of this paper. 
36How we are supposed to understand Kant’s argument for the claim that humanity is an end in itself is a 
subject of some controversy (see Hill, Analysis of Arguments, pp.123-4).  On the one hand, we can 
understand Kant as claiming that humanity is an objective end, and is an end in itself, and the argument is 
an argument by elimination (that also depends on the claim that something has to be an objective end, if 
there is a Categorical Imperative).  On the other hand, the conclusion is that we must regard humanity as an 
end in itself, and the argument proceeds from the way we each regard ourselves as objective ends to the 
fact that we must regard all others as objective ends.  I think that both interpretations are correct:  Kant 
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 Kant uses his claim (which depends on there being a categorical imperative) that 
there is an objective end to ground another formulation of the categorical imperative, the 
humanity as an end formulation (FH).  This imperative is, “Act in such a way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means” (4:230).  One fails in one’s perfect duty when 
one treats another as a mere means, and one fails in one’s imperfect duty when one fails 
to treat another as an end.   
 We now have the information we need in order to be able to understand how to 
apply FUL more specifically.  Let us consider the first condition that FUL provides, that 
we must be able to conceive that our maxim is universally permissible, if acting on the 
maxim is permitted.  If there is a categorical imperative, Kant thinks, then there is an 
objective end, and it is humanity (rational nature, agency).  It is a fact then, if there is a 
categorical imperative, that humanity is an objective end, a fact that does not depend on 
our wills.  We cannot conceive, Kant must think, that a maxim in which ends-in-
themselves are treated as mere means could possibly be universally permitted, because 
we cannot conceive that a maxim in which something that has absolute worth is treated as 
if it does not have absolute worth (4:228) could be willed to be universal law.  Therefore, 
any maxim that involves treating another rational being (a being that is an end-in-itself) 
as a mere means will not conform to the categorical imperative.  It is this result that 
legitimates Kant’s claim that we must never treat humanity (oneself or another) merely as 
a means.   
                                                                                                                                                 
needs both conclusions, that humanity is an end in itself and that we must regard humanity to be an end in 




 Let us consider the second condition provided by FUL, that we must be able to 
will a maxim to be a universal law, if acting on the maxim is permitted.  Kant thinks that 
we must regard humanity as an end-in-itself—we necessarily conceive of rational nature 
as an end-in-itself.  Rational nature, humanity, is a rationally necessary end for all 
rational beings.  Therefore, any maxim that involves failing to treat an end-in-itself as an 
end-in-itself will result in a contradiction in the will of the agent, and therefore will not 
meet the condition set by FUL.  And from this we can see that any maxim that involves 
failing to treat another rational being (a being that is an end-in-itself) as an end-in-itself 
will not conform to the categorical imperative.  It is this result that legitimates Kant’s 
claim that we must treat humanity (oneself or another) always at the same time as an end. 
Section 5: Answering Wood’s objection 
 At this point, we are able to return to Wood’s counterexample and see why it fails 
against Kant’s argument.  Remember, Wood objected that if Kant’s argument for FUL 
was successful and valid, then there ought to be a contradiction in maintaining both of the 
following theses:   
1. The principle of self-love (“Always seek your own happiness”) is an objective 
principle.   
2. The principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of morality. 
If 2 is true, that is, if the principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of 
morality, then it must be either because willing it to be universally followed results in a 
contradiction in conception/nature or because willing it to be universally followed results 
in a contradiction in the will.  In other words, if self-love is not compatible with the 
principle of morality, there must be a reason why it is not compatible with the principle of 
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morality—and it is this fact that we will exploit to show why 1 and 2 do result in a 
contradiction.   
 Suppose that in Wood’s example, the reason (2) is true (that is, the reason that the 
principle of self-love is not compatible with the principle of morality) is because it is not 
possible to conceive that a maxim to seek one’s own happiness is universally permitted.  
Well, one very convincing reason that it would not be possible to conceive such a maxim 
as being universally permitted is that such a maxim presupposes that happiness is an end-
in-itself, i.e. has absolute worth.37  Remember, we have learned that for Kant, humanity is 
the only end-in-itself.  In other words, the principle of self-love requires that we take 
something that is not an end-in-itself and treat it as an end-in-itself.  But it is impossible 
to conceive of a world where it is universally required to treat something as an end-in-
itself when it is not.    
 The reason the principle of self-love cannot be conceived without contradiction to 
be universally followed is that we know that humanity is the only objective end, and yet 
the principle of self-love presupposes that happiness is an objective end.  But we now are 
in a position to see that (1) (that the principle of self-love is an objective principle) cannot 
be true, since happiness is not an objective end.38 So, if happiness is not an objective end, 
then the principle of self-love cannot be an objective principle. In other words, our 
                                                 
37A difficulty here is that this is not the reason Wood gives for supposing that the principle of self-love is 
not the principle of morality.  However, we run into similar problems in Kant’s own text.  He gives one 
reason for supposing that false promising is not permissible in FUL, and another reason that is not 
equivalent for supposing that false promising is not permissible in FH.  I am not sure what to say about 
these difficulties.  
38Remember, the idea that the principle of self-love is an objective principle presupposes that happiness is 
an objective end.  If happiness were not an objective end, then it would not be the case that every rational 
agent always had a necessary ground for pursuing happiness, and therefore the principle of self-love would 
not be an objective principle.     
78 
  
argument for (2) amounts to a reductio of (1).  And therefore there is a contradiction in 
supposing both (1) and (2).  So, Wood is wrong that there is no contradiction in 
supposing (1) and (2), at least so long as the reason (2) is true is that supposing the 
principle of self-love to be universally followed results in a contradiction in 
conception/nature. 
 Alternatively, suppose that the reason (2) is true is that willing the principle of 
self-love to be universally followed results in a contradiction in the will.  Our reasoning 
here will be exactly parallel to the reasoning above.  The contradiction in the will that 
appears when the egoist tries to will that the principle of self-love is universally permitted 
is due to the fact that the egoist (as a rational being) necessarily has rational nature as a 
necessary end, and yet the principle of self-love requires that he take happiness to be his 
necessary (ultimate) end.  Taking happiness to be his necessary end would contradict his 
actual necessary end, which is rational nature. 
 But we now are in a position to see that (1) (that self-love is an objective 
principle) cannot be true, since happiness is not the egoist’s (or any rational being’s) 
objective end.  In other words, our argument for (2) amounts to a reductio of (1).  And 
therefore there is a contradiction in supposing both (1) and (2).  So, again, Wood is 
wrong that there is no contradiction in supposing (1) and (2), at least so long as the reason 
(2) is true is that supposing the principle of self-love to be universally followed results in 
a contradiction in conception/nature. 
Section 6: Conclusion 
In this paper, I have discussed Wood’s objection that Kant’s argument that the 
Universal Law Formulation (FUL) is a formulation of the Categorical Imperative relies 
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on an invalid inference.  We saw that at the heart of Wood’s objection is the contention 
that Kant confuses, on the one hand, the question of what is rational for an agent to will 
for himself, and on the other hand, the question of what is rational for an agent to will for 
everyone.  I have tried to show, however, that by distinguishing carefully between what 
Kant wants to accomplish in the universal law formulation and what he wants to 
accomplish in the Humanity Formulation (FH), we can interpret Kant in such a way that 
he avoids making the mistake Wood thinks he sees in the argument.  I have argued that 
Kant does not expect the general point of view, as expressed in the universal law 
formulation, alone to pick out all and only worthy maxims.  Instead, we must also rely on 
a universal end—humanity—and the humanity formulation expresses the role Kant thinks 
the universal end will play in our deliberation and maxim-selection. In this way, I have 
tried to defend Kant’s attempt to define a central role for a general, impartial point of 
view in his moral theory, while also addressing the concerns of critics who think that a 





Mill’s proof of Utilitarianism 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that Hume and Kant both take the 
recognition that morality involves an impartial point of view as the starting point for their 
investigation.  It is far less clear that Mill’s starting point is the same as that of Hume and 
Kant.  However, I will argue that we can rescue the proof of utilitarianism in Chapter 4 
from the traditional objections with an interpretation according to which Mill moves with 
us from a first-personal point of view to a general or impartial point of view. In this way, 
I will interpret Mill so that his approach to moral theory is more closely aligned to 
Hume’s and Kant’s approaches than we previously might have thought.   
In the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism,68 Mill presents an argument that he calls a 
“proof” of the utilitarian view.  Mill’s proof, broadly, amounts to a defense of two main 
claims.   The first is that happiness is an end of human conduct, and the second is that 
happiness is the only end of human conduct.  I interpret Mill as a teleologist69 (for 
reasons that will be discussed briefly later), and accordingly, if he succeeds in 
demonstrating that happiness is an end in itself, and the only end in itself, he will have 
succeeded in demonstrating (within the teleological framework) the truth of 
utilitarianism.  That is, if he succeeds in demonstrating that happiness is an end and the 
                                                 
68 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher.  Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 
2001. 
69To use Wellman’s term (269).   The defense is not intended to be convincing to those who are not 
persuaded by a teleological approach to ethics.  My aim in this paper is to show that, in Mill’s world, given 
his basic moral framework, the argument is not subject to the fallacies that have been attributed to it.  Carl 
Wellman, “A Reinterpretation of Mill’s Proof,” Ethics, v.69:4, pp.268-276. 
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only end in itself, then he will have succeeded in demonstrating that acts are right insofar 
as they promote happiness, and that acts are wrong insofar as they fail to do so.     
Of the controversy that this proof has engendered, most has focused on this first 
claim, Mill’s claim that happiness is an end of human conduct.  As the purpose of this 
paper is to help defend Mill against the critics of his argument, I will focus on the same 
part of the proof that the critics have. While Mill goes on to argue that nothing other than 
happiness is an end in itself, that argument can be viewed as an argument distinct from 
his attempt to prove that happiness is an end in itself.   
The argument that happiness is an end in itself has two main steps.  Mill begins 
by claiming that the fact that something (in this case, happiness, but the principle is broad 
enough to apply to anything) is desired is evidence that it is desirable.  Second, he moves 
from the fact that individual happiness is desirable (to the individual) to the fact that the 
aggregate happiness is desirable (to the aggregate).  This argument as a whole (that 
happiness is an end of human conduct, i.e. that it is valuable and desirable), may be 
briefly reconstructed as follows:   
P1.  What is desired is desirable.  (Or, a desire for X is evidence that X is 
desirable.)   
P2.  Happiness is desired.   
P3.  Happiness is desirable (or at least, we have evidence that happiness is 
desirable, from P1 and P2). 
P4.  Since each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is 
desirable. 
Critics have tended to object to P1 and to P4.70  They claim that P1 is controversial at 
best, and obviously wrong at worst, and point to cases where a thing is allegedly desired 
                                                 
70See, for example: Hardy Jones, “Mill’s Argument for the Principle of Utility,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, v.38:3, pp.338-354.  R. F. Atkinson, “J. S. Mill’s ‘Proof’ of the Principle of 
Utility,” Philosophy, v.32:121, pp.158-167.  James Seth gives a good summary of classic objections, 
including those by Sidgwick and Dewey.  For objections to P1, see pp.474-5, and for objections to P4, see 
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but not desirable.  They claim that P4 is a non sequitur, and that Mill’s inference relies on 
the fallacy of composition.   
 My defense of Mill will involve emphasizing the importance of the role that 
points of view play in this argument.  What I will suggest is that P1 and P4 are said from 
very different points of view, and it is critical to understanding each premise that we 
understand the point of view from which it is uttered.  When Mill claims that the fact that 
one desires something implies that thing is desirable, the implication is claimed from the 
first-person point of view.  That I desire something is evidence to me that it is desirable 
for me (and the only possible such evidence).  But when we move through the argument 
to P4, the point of view is a more general, moral point of view.  The move from my 
happiness being good to me to the aggregate happiness being a good to the aggregate is 
legitimated by taking up a general, moral point of view.  From the moral point of view, 
we draw conclusions about what is morally desirable, using what each individual desires 
as considerations.  
With these modifications, we can understand Mill’s argument as follows: 
1. I desire my happiness, and I therefore view it as desirable to me, and 
it is a good to me.  
2. Once I adopt a POV stripped of the features that are particular to me, 
I see that the fact that my happiness is a good to me doesn’t depend 
on particular features either of my happiness or of me. 
3. Therefore, happiness (everyone’s happiness, not just mine, or yours) 
is a good in itself.71 
                                                                                                                                                 
pp.469-72.  James Seth, “The Alleged Fallacies in Mill’s Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Review, 
v.17:5, pp.469-488. 
71We will see later in more detail what this means, for Mill. 
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4. Therefore, morality requires that we promote the general happiness 
(because qua a teleologist, Mill holds that morality requires that we 
promote what is an end in itself).   
Mill does not explicitly refer to a general, moral, point of view, so we do not have very 
much guidance about what features this point of view would have.  However, I believe it 
is sufficient to abstract away everything specific from our individual points of view and 
come to an unbiased point of view that represents what we all share, as humans.  
Moreover, given that this is an attempt to understand the proof, the only real requirement 
is to understand this “general point of view” in such a way that it succeeds in resolving 
the difficulties that commentators have traditionally found in the argument. 
 In this paper, I will begin with a brief overview of Mill’s view and proof, focusing 
mainly on the elements that will be relevant for interpreting the proof in chapter 4.  I will 
then turn to P1, Mill’s claim that the fact that something is desired implies that it is 
desirable, and argue that the claim is considerably more plausible than it has been 
thought, once we interpret it from the first-person point of view.  A discussion of P4 will 
follow, and again, I will argue that understanding the claim from a moral point of view 
legitimates the controversial inference (and we will pay special attention to what we will 
have learned about desirability in the course of our investigation into P1). 
Section 1: Overview 
 The central claim of utilitarianism is that an action’s rightness or wrongness 
derives from the extent to which it maximizes (or fails to maximize) happiness.  Right 
actions are those that maximize happiness, and wrong actions are those that do not 
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maximize happiness.72  This is the view that Mill undertakes to defend in the “proof” of 
utilitarianism.  He states the view, at the outset, as follows:  
Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.  By happiness is intended 
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation 
of pleasure (7). 
He also provides, helpfully, a gloss for what he means by happiness:  it is a positive 
balance of pleasure over pain.  Conversely, unhappiness is a positive balance of pain over 
pleasure.   
His later argument, the proof, is solely focused on arguing that happiness is an 
end, the sole end, of human action.  Consider, for example, what he says in his argument 
for the proof of utilitarianism: 
The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing 
desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as a means to 
that end (35). 
The utilitarian doctrine, then, has been referred to as both of the following:  one, that 
happiness is (and is the only thing) desirable as an end, and two, that actions are right in 
virtue of the extent to which they promote happiness.  In order for these two claims to be 
equivalent, we must close the gap by understanding Mill as advancing (as Wellman calls 
it, 268) a teleological moral view.  That is to say, we must understand Mill to be taking 
for granted that morality requires us to promote what is desirable and valuable, and never 
                                                 
72In chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, Mill seems to endorse a kind of rule-utilitarianism, and he claims that some 
principles of justice (those that are “expedient”, or themselves maximize happiness) in some cases are more 
binding than just the imperative to maximize happiness.  “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral 
rules which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute 
obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the 
essence of the idea of justice—that of a right residing in an individual—implies and testifies to this more 
binding obligation” (59).  In light of this modification, we can see that in some cases, an action that would 
maximize happiness may contradict the more important rule of justice, and in these cases, the right action is 
the one that accords with the rule of justice. 
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to fail to do so.  Or, what is the same for Mill, he must be taking for granted that morality 
requires us to promote the end of human action.  Wellman writes, on this topic,  
Mill’s position is that (I) all obligation is grounded exclusively in value.  
The only factor which determines the rightness or wrongness of an action 
is the goodness or badness which it contains or produces. 
In fact, we can see Mill himself closing this gap and more or less explicitly expressing a 
teleological moral view in the following quotations: 
Happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test 
by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily 
follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in 
the whole (39). 
According to the greatest happiness principle […] the ultimate end, with 
reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable—
whether we are considering our own good or that of other people—is an 
existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in 
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality….  This, being 
according to the utilitarian opinion the end of human action, is 
necessarily also the standard of morality, which may accordingly be 
defined “the rules and precepts for human conduct” (12). 
In this, Mill’s framework, one has only to prove that something is desirable or valuable in 
order to prove that it is the standard of morality.  Mill does not argue for this 
framework73, and, of course, ethicists of a different persuasion would vigorously resist 
his assumption. For the purposes of this paper, however, we will just note this 
commitment of Mill’s and move on.  For Mill, proving the truth of utilitarianism need 
only involve proving that happiness is desirable, and therefore an end, the only end, of 
human action74.  Once we have established that fact, for Mill, we have sufficient proof 
                                                 
73From the get-go, he claims that we only need to prove that happiness is an end in itself and the only end 
in itself, in order to establish the truth of utilitarianism. He appears to think it self-evident that morality is 
concerned with exclusively promoting ends-in-themselves. 
74We will see later that there are different ways a thing can be desirable.  Only those things that are 
desirable from the general point of view are ends of human action.   
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that utilitarianism is true. So, the first important point for us to notice going into the proof 
is what Mill’s conclusion must be: that happiness is the only end of human action. 
Before we begin our investigation of this proof, though, a little more background 
will be helpful. One important thing to notice going forward will be that this issue—of 
what makes an action right—is distinct, for Mill, from the issue of what motivation  a 
person has to perform that action. That is, we need to distinguish Mill’s argument for the 
truth of utilitarianism from his account of moral motivation, his account of why we act in 
ways we take to be moral. In the spirit of keeping these two issues distinct, Mill is at 
great pains to show that the reasons we have to act morally, as well as the reasons we 
have for not acting immorally, are the same for any system of morals.  Utilitarianism is 
neither more nor less subject to any problem concerning moral motivation.   
It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this 
question, which, though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to 
the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above 
others, really arises in regard to all standards.  It arises, in fact, whenever 
a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any 
basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it (27). 
He then explicates what he takes to be the sources of motivation for any moral system.  
He divides these sources into two types: internal and external sanctions. 
The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not 
have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals.  Those 
sanctions are either external or internal (28). 
External sanctions are, as might be inferred from the name, sanctions that are imposed 
from outside a person in an attempt to keep his actions in line with morality.  These can 
include any anticipated physical or moral punishment from god or man (e.g. hell, jail, 
fines, loss of friendship or respect, etc).   
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The internal sanction, in contrast, is a “subjective feeling in our own minds”, i.e., 
our conscience.  Mill describes the feeling as follows. 
The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is 
one and the same—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, 
attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures 
rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility.  
This feeling, when disinterested and correcting itself with the pure 
idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of 
the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience… (28-
29). 
It is our conscience, Mill thinks, that moves us to act morally, and also that which moves 
us to refrain from acting immorally.  Insofar as this is true, it does not matter to which 
system of morals our conscience is attached.   Our conscience will push us to do what we 
regard as right and as our duty.  If we regard utilitarianism as true, then our conscience 
will push us to maximize happiness, and restrain us from acting in such a way that would 
not maximize happiness.   
The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) 
being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to 
those whose standard is utility in the question, what is the sanction of that 
particular standard?  We may answer, the same as of all other moral 
standards—the conscientious feelings of mankind.  Undoubtedly this 
sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the 
feelings it appeals to; but neither will these persons be more obedient 
to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one (29). 
We can see, then, that Mill regards this issue (what causes us to act morally) to be 
entirely separate from the issue of what the correct moral system is.  Utilitarianism may 
be true, another moral theory may be true—either way, it is our conscience that pushes us 
to do what we take to be right.75 So, the second important point for us to notice going 
                                                 
75One might concede this much to Mill, and still think that it is the obligation of particular moral systems to 
account for, not our motivation to be moral, but for our reason to be moral. There are, after all, plenty of 
people that abandon Hume’s thesis that something can only be a reason if it is motivating.  Mill seems to 
think that reason and motivation are more or less the same, however.  In light of the fact that (as I will later 
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forward is that Mill’s proof, while presented in the idiom of “desire”, does not concern 
the question whether and why we have moral motivation. It is not meant to address the 
question: why be moral?  Rather, that idiom is meant to signal only Mill’s teleological 
framework: again, that happiness is the sole end of human action.  Mill’s proof is meant 
to answer questions about what makes right acts right, and not to answer questions about 
what reason or motivation we have to perform right acts.  
Let us turn now to consider an overview of Mill’s proof of utilitarianism. As we 
have just seen, this proof is not intended to convince us each individually that we have 
reason to promote the general happiness.  Mill has been quite careful to distinguish what 
he takes to be the criteria from what he takes to be the reason to obey morality. His proof 
should be regarded as a philosophical investigation, in which Mill intends to discover 
what the moral principle is, the principle according to which our actions are properly 
judged right or wrong (the “summum bonum,” as he says).  He repeatedly emphasizes that 
he intends to discover the “criteria of morality,” and this should be contrasted with any 
reasons we have for acting morally.  Consider the following passage.  
They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act 
from the inducement of promoting the general interest of society.  But this 
is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals and confound 
the rule of action with the motive of it.  It is the business of ethics to tell 
us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system 
of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of 
duty (18). 
In the proof, what Mill takes himself to need to provide is twofold.  First, he must 
demonstrate that happiness is an end of human conduct.  Second, he must demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                                 
argue) it is more charitable to Mill to understand his “proof” as if it is not intended to provide us with 
reasons, I will set this issue aside.  
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that happiness is the only end of human conduct.76  Given that, as I am interpreting him, 
he is a teleologist, if he succeeds in demonstrating that happiness is an end in itself, and 
the only end in itself, he will have succeeded in demonstrating the truth of 
utilitarianism—that acts are right insofar as they maximize happiness, and that acts are 
wrong insofar as they fail to do so.     
Most of the controversy surrounding Mill’s proof has focused on the first claim, 
the part of the proof in which Mill argues that happiness is an end of human conduct.  
While Mill goes on to argue that nothing other than happiness is an end in itself, the later 
argument can be viewed as distinct from his attempt to prove that happiness is an end in 
itself.  As the purpose of this paper is to help defend Mill against the critics of his 
argument, we will focus on the same part of the proof that they have: Mill’s argument 
that happiness is an end in itself. As we saw in the introduction, this argument has two 
main steps.  First, he claims that the fact that something (happiness) is desired is evidence 
that it is desirable.  Second, he moves from the claim that individual happiness is 
desirable to the individual to the claim that the aggregate happiness is desirable to the 
aggregate.  Again, as we saw in the introduction, this argument (that happiness is an end 
of human conduct, i.e. that it is valuable and desirable), may be briefly reconstructed as 
follows:   
P1.  What is desired is desirable.  (Or, a desire for X is evidence that X is 
desirable.)   
P2.  Happiness is desired.   
P3.  Happiness is desirable (or at least, we have evidence that happiness is 
desirable, from P1 and P2). 
P4.  Since each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is 
desirable. 
                                                 
76By “end”, he means “end in itself”, thereby excluding intermediate ends, those which are ends merely for 
the sake of some further end. 
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Let us now consider the controversial premises (P1 and P4) in turn. 
Section 2: P1 
 We can begin with P1, in which Mill claims that the fact that something is desired 
is evidence that it is desirable.  Mill writes, 
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that 
people actually see it.  The only proof that a sound is audible is that people 
hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience.  In like manner, I 
apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable is that people actually desire it (35). 
Prima facie, this passage contains an elementary flaw of reasoning.  The analogy 
between visibility and audibility, on the one hand, and desirability seems flawed.  
Whereas “visible” and “audible” just mean “able to be seen” and “able to be heard,” 
respectively, desirable does not mean “able to be desired.”  It means, rather, something 
like “worthy of desire.”  So, even if it is true that the only proof of an object’s visibility is 
that it is seen, and that the only proof of an object’s audibility is that it is heard, it does 
not seem to follow that the only proof for an object’s desirability is therefore that it is 
desired. That something is desired would be a proof that it is capable of being desired, but 
that is not the sense of ‘desirable’ that Mill needs. He needs a proof that happiness is 
worthy of desire, and the analogy with vision and hearing cannot, prime facie, earn him 
that. Furthermore, apart from the failure of this analogy, it just does not seem true that a 
thing’s being desired implies that thing’s desirability.  Again, prima facie, we seem to be 
able to come up with many examples where an undesirable object (an object not worthy 
of being desired) is desired nonetheless.    
Interpreters of Mill rightly set to work by trying to find a reading of the text that 
can resolve these prima facie difficulties.  While some of them do an admirable job of 
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partially resolving the difficulties, I don’t believe any of the interpretations to date have 
succeeded entirely.  The interpretation I will propose later in this paper is an attempt to 
build on what I take to be the most successful of these (the “sufficient condition” 
interpretation), and amend it so that the remaining difficulties are resolved.  I will show 
both that there is good sense to be made of Mill’s analogy between seeing, hearing, and 
desiring, and that these purported examples of items that are unworthy of being desire, 
but are desired nonetheless can be shown to miss their mark once we understand Mill 
correctly.  To begin, we must consider the previous attempts at understanding Mill 
charitably. 
 Some interpreters of Mill defend this premise, P1, by claiming that Mill’s view is 
a type of psychological hedonism.  On this sort of interpretation, Mill is understood as 
arguing that happiness (or pleasure) is, in principle, the only kind of thing that we are 
able to desire.  The proof, then, can be reconstructed as follows:   
1. If something is desirable, then we must be able to desire it.   
2. We are only able to desire pleasure/happiness.   
3. Something is desirable.77  
Conclusion: Therefore, pleasure/happiness is desirable.   
James Seth, for example, is a proponent of this interpretation of Mill.  Consider this 
passage from “The Alleged Fallacies in Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’”: 
And we must admit that the truth of the doctrine of psychological 
Hedonism carries with it the negation of any non-hedonistic theory of the 
Good, or the desirable in the sense of what ought to be desired.  While we 
cannot say that what we are able to desire is, as such, what we ought to 
desire, we must admit that what we ought to desire is what we are able to 
                                                 
77As Hardy Jones points out, this premise may not be explicitly stated:  This “interpretation begins with the 
weak relation between the desired and the desirable.  If nothing else is desired, there is no evidence that 
anything else is desirable.  In order validly to infer that happiness is desirable, another premise must be 
added:  (3) Something is desirable” (344). 
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desire.  It follows that, if pleasure is the only thing that we can desire, 
what we ought to desire cannot be anything other than pleasure (476).  
This interpretation seems to resolve the objections by sidestepping them.  The 
analogy between visibility and audibility, on the one hand, and desirability, on the other 
hand, no longer does any inferential work.   If that is true, then objections that attempt to 
undermine the analogy by showing that the visible/seen relationship is very different than 
the desirable/desired relationship are no threat to the argument.  They may be appropriate 
criticisms of his presentation, but Mill’s proof remains unscathed.  Another virtue of this 
interpretation is that it seems to avoid objections that depend on counterexamples of 
things that are desired yet not desirable.  If Mill is a psychological hedonist, it is senseless 
to say that there are cases where something is desired that is not desirable, since we are 
only able to desire happiness.  In these ways, this interpretation circumvents the 
objections. 
I believe, however, there are good textual reasons to reject the psychological 
hedonism interpretation as an interpretation of Mill’s proof.  Hardy Jones, in “Mill’s 
Argument for the Principle of Utility,” rightly points out that psychological hedonism 
requires an unnatural reading of the text, since on this interpretation we know from the 
outset that happiness is the only thing we can possibly desire.  Mill goes on to argue for 
several pages after the passage in question that nothing but happiness is desirable as an 
end.  He takes great pains to prove that virtue and money, for example, are not desirable 
as an end, but only desirable as a means to an end.78  Yet, his doing so seems 
                                                 
78Of course, he doesn’t stop there.  His point ends up being that these things (money, virtue) are part of 
happiness, and as such they are desirable as an end.  But until we know that they are part of happiness, we 
cannot regard them as desirable as an end.   
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inexplicable, if his earlier claim indeed depends on happiness/pleasure truly being the 
only thing that we are even capable of desiring as an end.    
[Mill] believes himself to have shown that happiness is a good, by the 
discussion of paragraph three, before he even begins to consider the view 
that humans are capable of desiring only happiness.  He regards this claim 
as the basis for the conclusion that happiness is the only (intrinsically) 
desirable end.  But the argument provided by the PH interpretation 
requires it even for the minimal conclusion that happiness is desirable.  
The account imposes an unnatural, circuitous reading of the text (345). 
Furthermore, Jones points out, Mill’s claim that the sole evidence that x is desirable is 
that it is desired, on this interpretation, plays no role in the argument.  Remember, Mill 
claims that “the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that 
people do actually desire it.”  But on this interpretation, our discovery that happiness is 
desirable is not deduced from the fact that we desire it.  Jones writes, 
What Mill states as a premise, or at least a basis, for his argument forms 
no part of the support for its conclusion.  The essential point is not that 
happiness is desired, but that it is the only thing capable of being 
desired….  Either the interpretation is mistaken, or Mill has incoherently 
represented his own argument (345). 
Jones has provided two good objections on textual grounds.  For our purposes, they are 
sufficient grounds to set the psychological hedonism interpretation of the proof aside.79 
 Let us investigate another interpretive strategy.  On this sort of strategy, we must 
understand Mill as claiming that desire is evidence for desirability.  The view that Mill is 
positing an evidentiary relationship between desire and desirability seems very plausible 
out of the gate, since it fits right in with Mill’s language (“evidence,” “proof,” etc…).  
Supposing this is right, it is important to see that there are still two possible ways of 
                                                 
79Here I do not mean to take a stand on whether or not Mill is a psychological hedonist.  His later argument, 
that happiness is the only thing desirable in itself, would certainly seem to point in that direction.  My point 




understanding Mill’s claim to be a claim about evidence: desire can be either sufficient 
evidence of desirability or insufficient evidence of it.80  If one interprets Mill according to 
the “sufficient evidence” (SC) view, then one understands him as claiming that the fact 
that something is desired is sufficient evidence that it is desirable (worthy of desire).  If 
one interprets him, on the other hand, according to the “inconclusive evidence” (IE) view, 
then one understands him to be claiming that the fact that something is desired is 
evidence, albeit inconclusive (i.e. defeasible) evidence that it is desirable.   
 Clearly, the inconclusive evidence view is a weaker version of this sort of 
interpretation than the sufficient condition view.  The main reason to accept it is that one 
is inclined toward an interpretation in which Mill is claiming an evidentiary relationship 
between desire and desirability, and yet one believes the sufficient condition claim of the 
SC view is too strong.81  There are, however, independent textual reasons for resisting the 
IE interpretation.  Certainly, as Jones points out, Mill writes as if he has established more 
than just inconclusively that happiness/pleasure is desirable.  Consider the following 
quotations:   
“…we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which 
it is possible to require, that happiness is a good” (35).   
“If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true—if human 
nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of 
happiness or a means of happiness—we can have no other proof, and we 
can require no other, that these are the only things desirable” (39).  
                                                 
80Here I continue to follow Jones’ taxonomy of interpretations. 
81I believe the main reason for defending an “inconclusive evidence” interpretation is because one finds the 
alleged counterexamples (cases where a thing is purported to be desired but yet is not desirable) to be 
successful in demonstrating that desire is not sufficient evidence of a thing’s desirability—and yet that Mill 
must be putting forward a view according to which desire is evidence of a thing’s desirability, in which 
case it is clear that desire is insufficient evidence of desirability. 
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His claims that we can require no further proof would appear to be false if he had proven 
only inconclusively that happiness is desirable.  Since I believe the doubts that would 
cause us to prefer IE to SC can be addressed, let us turn to the SC interpretation. 
  According to the SC interpretation, when Mill says “the sole evidence it is 
possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it,” he 
means that not only is it the sole evidence, but also that it is sufficient evidence.82  
Desiring x is sufficient evidence that x is desirable.  Of course, as the argument proceeds, 
we would discover that we desire happiness, and therefore we would have sufficient 
evidence that happiness is desirable.  As we saw earlier, Mill writes as if he believes he 
has proven that happiness is desirable, a fact which supports the sufficient condition 
interpretation. 
 The main virtue of the sufficient condition interpretation, namely that it seems to 
be the most natural reading of the passage in question, also turns out to be, at least on the 
face of it, a vice.  That it is the most natural reading of the text seems to subject it, more 
than other interpretations, to the objections we were considering.  In fact, the objections 
take the SC interpretation as their main target.  The analogy between visibility/audibility 
and desirability seems to provide much of the force behind the claim that desires are 
sufficient evidence for desirability (in the way that hearing or seeing something is 
sufficient evidence that it is audible or visible).  And, of course, if we were persuaded 
                                                 
82Wellman offers a version of the SC interpretation according to which desire is sufficient for desirability in 
the case of ends but not means.  I don’t find this strategy to be particularly promising (it is an odd 
distinction to hold for this principle, and doesn’t find much support in the text).  Furthermore, while this 
may rescue Mill from difficulties arising from P1, the resulting interpretation is subject to Jones’ objection 
to P4 (which we will discuss later).  Jones’ objection is that Mill does not demonstrate that aggregate 
happiness is the same as the end prescribed by utilitarianism, and on Wellman’s view, this will be true.    
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that we can desire things that are not desirable, this interpretation does not appear to have 
assuaged our concerns. 
 Raphael expresses the worries just discussed (and against which he defends Mill) 
as follows: 
The alleged fallacy is as follows.  Mill talks as if the word “desirable” had 
the same relation to the word “desired” as the word “visible” has to the 
word “seen.”  Now “visible” means “able to be seen;” “desirable” means 
“worthy of being desired.”  If a thing is seen, it follows that it can be seen.  
If a thing is desired, it follows analogously that it can be desired, but not 
that it ought, or is worthy, to be desired (347). 
Jones expresses the last point, that we can desire things that are not desirable, by arguing 
that the claim that desire for x is sufficient for demonstrating x’s desirability “appears to 
be obviously false,” saying, “Mill must have recognized that a thing’s being desired is not 
sufficient for it to be desirable” (341-2).  
This objection appears to rely largely on the contention that there are things that 
we desire that are yet undesirable.  Therefore, we will do Mill the favor of considering 
the plausibility of these counterexamples.  Note that if these counterexamples do not 
succeed, (that is, if there is nothing of which it is true to say that it is desired and yet not 
desirable), then Mill’s principle (that desire is sufficient evidence for desirability) will 
have been vindicated.  If there is nothing that is desired yet is undesirable, then Mill’s 
claim that desiring x is sufficient evidence for x’s desirability will be true.83 
We can begin with the easiest to dismiss.  Jones argues that Mill’s own writings 
themselves can function as a counterexample, saying that Mill’s own ethical work “may 
be understood as aimed at getting people to stop desiring undesirable things and to start 
desiring desirable ones” (342).  Jones’ point is that Mill would not bother trying to 
                                                 
83Of course, textually, we will still have to explain the analogy between desirability and visibility.  
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convince us of the truth of utilitarianism, if he were not trying to convince us that some of 
what we desire is undesirable.  Mill’s own writings, the reasoning goes, belie the truth of 
the claim that desiring implies desirability.  If we only desired desirable things, we would 
not need moralists to try to point us in the proper direction.  We do desire undesirable 
things, however, and therefore desiring cannot imply desirability. 
Notice the different meanings of “desirable” and the attendant different standards 
according to which something is worthy of being desired. One such standard is a moral 
one, and while “desirable” can in some contexts mean “morally desirable”, it certainly 
does not have to mean that.  For example, we can say that sunny weather is desirable, but 
this clearly has nothing to do with morality.  Someone who agrees with it does not agree 
on moral grounds, and someone who disagrees equally does not disagree on moral 
grounds.  Or, we can say that a house is located in a desirable location, and this does not 
mean that it is in a morally desirable location.  Examples abound—many things from 
different facets of life are desirable without thereby being morally desirable. 
In fact, at this stage of the argument, it is hard to see how to interpret Mill 
charitably while also interpreting him as claiming that a thing’s being desired implies that 
it thereby morally desirable.  For one thing, this would seem to be an awfully 
controversial premise for Mill to employ with no defense at all. This way of reading 
‘desirability’ would have it that Mill’s very first premise is that a thing’s being desired 
implies that that thing is a moral end. It is more controversial than the prima facie reading 
of the claim that desire implies desirability (and therefore doesn’t seem very charitable!).  
Furthermore, once Mill has claimed that desire implies moral desirability and that 
happiness is desired, he would have cut off any hope of arriving at utilitarianism.  For 
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once we discover that I desire my happiness, and therefore that my happiness is morally 
desirable,84 we seem to give up any hope of arriving at the moral desirability of the 
aggregate happiness.  That is, on this reading, Mill’s very first premise would already 
contradict his conclusion! 
If we do not interpret Mill as meaning morally desirable, in this premise, then the 
sense of desirable used in Jones’ objection (morally desirable) is a different sense than 
what Mill has in mind in his “proof.”  That is, it is plausible to say that he intends 
“desirable” in a broader sense that is not limited to morally desirable.  Jones is right that 
Mill’s own writings are an attempt to convince us that certain things are morally 
desirable, even when we don’t desire them.  But if Mill doesn’t mean morally desirable 
when he claims that desire implies desirability, then the fact that we desire things that 
aren’t morally desirable is not a successful counterexample.    
 There are other potential counterexamples, however.  Even if Mill does not mean 
that desiring implies moral desirability, one might still object that other standards of 
desirability make this claim of Mill’s equally implausible. That is, if Mill’s claim is not 
that a thing’s being desired implies that it is morally desirable, it must still be that a 
thing’s being desired implies that it is in some sense desirable, and whatever sense we 
appeal to will be equally subject to counterexample. Surely, one might object, on any 
plausible reading of ‘desirable’, there are things that we desire that are not desirable.  For 
example, we are familiar with cases in which people desire to undermine or destroy 
important goods, goods that we recognize as desirable.  Consider the following case.  A 
                                                 
84Instead, I will later argue that we should interpret Mill as claiming that each person’s happiness is 
desirable to him, but not that each  person’s happiness is morally desirable.  We do not get that happiness is 
morally desirable until later, when in P4 we adopt the moral point of view.  This “morally desirable” 
argument will come in section 3, on P4. 
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developer desires to raze an important national forest, a forest which contains many 
endangered species, in order to build condominiums and turn a huge profit.  In this case, 
razing the forest is clearly undesirable, because razing the forest compromises things that 
are desirable.  The developer desires to raze the forest, but we are not able to infer that 
razing the forest is desirable.85    
 Examples such as this do seem abundant and compelling. To see how Mill can 
deal with them nonetheless, it will be helpful to step back and take a bird’s eye view of 
his proof.  Mill begins by saying that our senses and our internal consciousness judge the 
first premises of knowledge, and he goes on to imply that it is the same for the first 
premises of our conduct (i.e. for moral principles).  He writes, 
To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles, to 
the first principles of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.  
But the former, being matters of fact, may be the subject of a direct appeal 
to the faculties which judge of fact—namely, our senses and our internal 
consciousness.  Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions 
of practical ends?  Or by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them?  
(35).  
In this passage, Mill claims that we learn of first principles of knowledge through our 
senses and our internal consciousness, and he implies that we learn of first principles of 
conduct (moral principles) in the same way—through our senses and our internal 
consciousness.  This passage is a clue, I think, that we must interpret his premise (that 
being desired is evidence of desirability) from a first-person point-of-view.  That is, the 
kind of appeal that Mill makes concerning the first principle of knowledge is an appeal to 
each of us to consult our own senses and internal consciousness for evidence of the truth 
                                                 
85For those that prefer to side with the developer, the case can easily be reversed.  The environmentalists 
desire to preserve the national forest and the endangered species that live in it, yet preserving the forest is 
not desirable.  So, either way, there are things that are desired and yet not desirable. 
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of such principles. We each must experience the truth of these principles for ourselves in 
order to have their truth “proven” to us. What is important here is not the epistemology of 
first principles of knowledge that Mill endorses, however, but rather the mode of appeal 
that he issues. Senses and internal consciousness are experienced first-personally.  To 
“prove” a first principle requires not an impersonal, third-person “proof”, but rather 
demonstration to a person that the first principle is correct. It requires a person to come to 
see that it is correct. If I am right that this is a clue, then the first step in understanding 
Mill’s claim about the kind of evidence that we can have for a thing’s desirability will be 
to reformulate that claim as making an analogous appeal to the experience of something 
as desirable. So, we should render that claim as follows:  the sole (and sufficient) 
evidence it is possible to provide me that something is desirable86 is that I desire it. 
With this in mind, let us return to the case of the developer.  In this case, the 
wedge between what is desired and what is desirable is driven by a disagreement between 
two separate parties.  The developer has the desire to raze the national forest, and the 
environmentalist finds that result undesirable.  One party has the desire, and the other 
party claims the desire is not for something that is desirable.  With this in mind, we can 
see that the developer case is not a successful counterexample.  The force of this 
counterexample comes from us seeing that the developer desires something that is not 
desirable.  This is not the proper form, however. In order to respect the newly uncovered 
form of Mill’s standard of evidence for such things, we need a case in which the same 
person both desires x and finds x undesirable.  We must pick a different case.   
                                                 
86We will see later that “desirable” will need to be qualified. 
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What we will see, in picking a case that involves the first-person point of view, is 
that once I desire something, I have no reason to think that it is not desirable (to or for 
me).  This claim (that once I desire something, I have no reason to think that it is not 
desirable, to or for me) is what supports the premise that desire is sufficient evidence for 
desirability.87  I will argue that supposed counterexamples to this view rely on a 
confusion between finding something desirable all-things-considered and finding it 
desirable per se.   But so long as we do not equivocate, we will see that desiring 
something necessitates finding it desirable.88 
Consider, then, the case of a reluctant smoker:  “I, a reluctant smoker, can desire a 
cigarette, or desire to smoke, even as I find smoking and cigarettes undesirable.”  This is 
a case of a person who desires something and yet finds it undesirable, and so seems to be 
of the proper form. Both the desire and the undesirability of the cigarettes are within the 
                                                 
87For Mill so interpreted, there is no external standard of desirability.  In other words, one might worry that 
we have only established a connection between my desiring something and my finding it desirable, but not 
the needed connection between desiring something and its being desirable.  However, we saw at the outset 
that Mill intends to rely on parallels between first principles of knowledge and first principles of conduct.  
We can only rely on our senses and our internal consciousness to learn what is desirable.   Therefore, there 
is no further proof (for Mill) that something is desirable than that I desire it and find it desirable.   
88Mill does not give an analysis of “desire” in the proof, and it would be tricky to do so on his behalf.  
However, we may not want to count “mere urges” as desires, since they seem relevantly different.  For 
example, if someone cuts me off in traffic, I may have the urge to crash into his car; however, I don’t 
necessarily find crashing into his car desirable.  However, we don’t usually think of this as a case of 
“desire.”  I don’t necessarily want to crash into his car, and it feels very different to me than other more 
standard desires.  Therefore, I think we have reason to interpret Mill’s use of “desire” in such a way that it 
does not include these kinds of “mere urges.”  C.f. Scanlon, paraphrasing and endorsing Warren Quinn’s 
point (38): “…although we may sometimes have such urges, the idea of such a purely functional state fails 
to capture something essential in the most common cases of desire:  desiring something involves having a 
tendency to see something good or desirable about it” (Thanks to Douglas MacLean for pointing this out.) 




smoker’s own purview. It also seems like a plausible enough case.89  Is it a 
counterexample to the sufficient-condition interpretation of Mill’s proof?   
 I will argue that it is not, but to see why, we must delve more deeply into this 
case. We must investigate why the reluctant smoker desires smoking and yet finds it 
undesirable.  What makes him think that smoking is undesirable?  Why is he a reluctant 
smoker?  Some common reasons for this kind of conflict would be because the reluctant 
smoker desires cigarettes, on the one hand, and health, smelling nice and/or saving 
money on the other.  In fact, it seems quite plausible that if he doesn’t desire health, 
smelling nice, or saving money, then he will not agree that such things are desirable.  
And if he does not find them desirable, then he will not, in turn, agree that smoking is not 
desirable.  The only way to make sense of him finding smoking undesirable, that is, is to 
imagine him as desiring other, incompatible things, and therefore finding these other, 
incompatible things themselves to be desirable.   
 This lesson is instructive.  We must be careful to distinguish a thing’s being 
desirable all things considered from a thing’s being desirable per se.  The claim we have 
been puzzling over in Mill is that desire implies desirability, and it is important not to 
equivocate.  If what we have just said is right, then what these kinds of counterexamples 
show is simply that to desire something per se does not imply that that thing is desirable 
all things considered. Surely, it is uncharitable to assume that Mill intended to deny this! 
That is, Mill’s claim cannot plausibly have been that desire for something per se implies 
that thing’s desirability all things considered.  If the example is one where something is 
desired per se, then we need to evaluate whether it is desirable per se, and not all-things-
                                                 
89And we can think of plenty of similar cases!  I, the reluctant dieter, desire chocolate cake even as I find it 
undesirable (for health reasons).  Many compelling cases, familiar experiences, fit this form.  
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considered.  Only if the example is one where something is desired all-things-considered 
would it be fair to evaluate whether it is desirable all-things-considered.   
In the case of the smoker, the complaint can be fleshed out as follows:  The 
smoker desires smoking per se, but does not find it desirable all-things-considered.  We 
have seen that using this fact to leverage the case as a counterexample requires a kind of 
equivocation.  What we need to find out, to test the true threat of this case for Mill’s 
proof, is whether the smoker finds smoking desirable per se, or, whether he desires 
smoking all-things-considered.  Here, our choice comes down to the following two 
interpretations of the desire/desirability connection. 
1.  Desiring x per se implies that x is desirable per se. 
2. Desiring x all-things-considered implies that x is desirable all things 
considered. 
As it turns out, Mill does go on later to prove that nothing else is desirable in itself, which 
will establish that happiness is desirable all-things-considered as well as per se.  Because 
of this, I believe we should understand Mill as defending the first claim—that desiring x 
per se implies that it is desirable per se.  
 I have not said anything yet about what it is to be desirable.  This was on purpose.  
I don’t believe that we need to say anything about what it is to be desirable, on this view.  
All that matters, for Mill’s view, is that one cannot desire something and yet find it 
undesirable (per se).  This is not a logical claim, or meant to be true in virtue of the 
definition.  Rather, I believe that for Mill, this is a psychological fact about us as humans.  
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If I desire something, per se, and from the first-person point of view, I will also see it as 
desirable, per se and from the first-person point of view90,91.   
Admittedly, the claim that something is desirable is often taken to mean that it is 
desirable all things considered; furthermore it is also often taken to imply that such a 
thing is desirable from an impartial point of view.  But Mill’s claim need not concern 
either of these senses of ‘desirable’.  In fact, the explanation of the smoker case that we 
have just considered provides a paradigm example of the kind of “proof” that Mill thinks 
we must give of a thing’s “desirability” and also of what it means for something to be 
desirable. It is a case of a person experiencing psychic conflict among his desires. He 
desires to smoke a cigarette, but he also desires to rid himself of an unhealthy habit.  The 
desire to rid himself of an unhealthy habit is what makes smoking seem undesirable to 
him—undesirable, once all of his desires are taken into consideration. But, taken alone, 
insofar as he desires to smoke a cigarette, he also finds it desirable92.   
Earlier, we worried that if a thing’s being desired implies that it is in some sense 
(even if not morally) desirable, the principle would remain subject to counterexample. 
We worried that on any plausible reading of ‘desirable’, there are things that we desire 
that are not desirable.  But what we have just seen is that Mill has closed the gap between 
                                                 
90We can say that, for Mill, a thing that is desirable is a good.  He uses that inference later in the proof, in 
P4.  This doesn’t seem to shed any real light on the matter at hand, but we should keep it in mind. 
91One might wonder how to explain seeing something as desirable yet lacking the corresponding desire.  
For example, my husband finds it desirable to follow baseball, and he can get me to see the desirability of it 
even though I never come to share his desire.  In a nutshell, Mill can appeal here to the difference between 
experiencing a desire and empathizing with someone else’s experience of a desire.  So what I come to 
understand is how it is desirable for my husband, from his point of view.  I do this by empathetically feeling 
his desire, but I do not desire it and it is therefore not desirable for me.    
92We may ask further metaphysical questions, such as, is the thing desirable because it is desired?  Is the 
desire just a sign that it is desirable?  Mill does not need to be able to answer these questions.  So long as it 
is true that desiring implies desirability (keeping in mind the appropriate conditions), it does not matter for 
the view why desiring implies desirability, or in virtue of what the implication is true.  
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desiring and finding something desirable.  Insofar as we accept Mill’s first-person 
standard of evidence, the principle seems to be able to fend off any potential 
counterexample.  Furthermore, with this standard of evidence in hand, we can see how 
the analogy between desirability and visibility is a helpful analogy.  Desiring x is the only 
evidence we can have that x is desirable (for me), in the same way that seeing x is the 
only evidence we can have that x is visible (to me). 
 We now have the material to dismiss Jones’ second objection.  He points out that 
there is conflict and confusion among human desires, and he claims that if SC were 
correct, there would thus be conflict and confusion among what is desirable.  He writes, 
…there is good reason to believe that Mill would have realized that either 
x or y could be undesirable though desired by A and B.  Many individuals’ 
personal ends are not consonant with the ultimate end of morality, the 
most important test of all human conduct (and thus of all human ends).  If 
they lack such consonance, surely they are not desirable (342). 
But we have seen that Mill’s claim needs to be evaluated from a first-person perspective.  
Conflict and confusion between people will not suffice to object to this premise.  Conflict 
and confusion between people would only suffice to object to the premise if we were 
evaluating this from a point of view other than first-personally.  For Mill, all that is 
required to convince me that something is desirable is to get me to desire it.  Insofar as I 
desire it, I also find it desirable (for me)93. 
Furthermore, conflict and confusion among desirable ends for a given individual 
is only problematic if we mean desirable all-things-considered.  However, we have 
                                                 
93Here, we should not think of this as an evaluative process.  It is true that prudential evaluations, for 
example, involve weighing pros and cons and deciding what (all things, or at least most things, considered) 
would be best for one.  But here, I mean to refer to a much more basic phenomenon.  Desiring something 
just is finding it desirable (for me).  And in order to find it desirable, I must come to desire it first.  The 
experience of desiring something is the same as the experience of finding something desirable, in the same 
way that the experience of seeing something is the same as the experience of finding it visible. 
106 
  
already seen good reason for interpreting Mill as meaning desirable per se.  If this is the 
case, however, then we can see that there is no threat in taking two incompatible things 
each as being desirable per se.  The reluctant smoker is a good example of this!  He finds 
many incompatible things each desirable per se.  So long as we don’t claim that they are 
all desirable all-things-considered, we will not be saying anything controversial, at least 
in Mill’s mind. 
In this section, I have argued that Mill’s claim (that desiring something is 
evidence for its desirability) is more plausible than it has been given credit for.  The 
problem has been that many readers interpreted “desirable” as being a much more loaded 
term than it needs to be for Mill’s purposes.  For each person, it is plausible to say (at 
least, Mill thought it plausible to say) that once he desires something, he finds that thing 
to be desirable (per se).  And given the lengths to which Mill goes to compare our 
experience of something as desired/desirable with our experience of something as 
seen/visible or heard/audible, it makes sense to understand his claim as being limited to 
the first person experience.  I have attempted to argue that counterexamples cannot apply 
to this principle when properly understood, since it is plausible to believe, so long as we 
don’t equivocate between things that are desired per se and things that are desired all 
things considered, that desiring something involves seeing it as desirable. 
Section 3: P4 
 Let us now proceed to discuss the second controversial move in Mill’s proof, P4:  
since each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is desirable.  At this 
stage in the argument, we will assume that the preceding section was convincing and that 
Mill has established that each person’s happiness is desirable to that person (desirable per 
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se).  The claim that we will be discussing in the second half of this paper, then, is found 
in the following passage: 
This [each person desires his own happiness], however, being a fact, we 
have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is 
possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness 
is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the 
aggregate of all persons (35-36). 
The standard objection here is that Mill’s inference relies on the fallacy of composition. 
A’s happiness may be a good to A, and B’s happiness may be a good to B, the objection 
goes, but we can’t thereby conclude that {A’s happiness + B’s happiness} is a good to {A 
+ B}.  Raphael, for example, summarizes the objection as follows (before defending Mill 
against it):94 
Here it is commonly said, Mill commits the fallacy of composition or 
division.  In his conclusion, he takes collectively the objects of all persons’ 
desires, with the phrase “the general happiness,” but takes the persons 
themselves distributively, interpreting the word “aggregate” to mean each 
of all the persons.  From the fact that A’s happiness is desirable for A, and 
B’s happiness desirable for me, it does not follow that A’s-happiness-plus-
B’s-happiness is desirable for A and desirable for B.  Mill believes he has 
proved this conclusion (349).95 
The objection is meant to draw our attention to two facts:  First, the aggregate of all 
persons may not have a good, being that it is not, itself, a person.  And second, while Mill 
may have succeeded in demonstrating that my happiness is a good to me, he did not 
succeed in demonstrating that just any happiness (and therefore the general happiness) is 
a good to me.  To put this point another way, Mill’s conclusion allegedly relies either on 
one or both of the following claims:  
                                                 
94And Seth, in “The Alleged Fallacies in Mill’s “Utilitarianism,” provides an overview of several of the 
main examples of this objection, pp.469-472. 
95 D. Daiches Raphael, “Fallacies in and about Mill’s Utilitarianism,” Philosophy, v.30:115, pp.344-357. 
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C1. The aggregated good is good for the aggregate (implying that the 
aggregate has a good). 
C2. The happiness of multiple people can be aggregated into a general 
happiness and both the individual and the aggregate happiness are equally 
good for each person.  
These claims are implausible and the objection, in drawing our attention to these two 
features of the argument, is meant to convince us to resist Mill’s conclusion. 
 Mill does say that happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons; let us note, 
however, that what he must mean is that happiness is a good 96 (and not just a good-for-
you or a good-for-me).  Mill doesn’t need to establish the claim that the aggregate of all 
persons actually has a good, much less that the aggregate has a good and that it is the 
happiness of the aggregate of all persons.  Utilitarianism does not actually depend on 
either of these claims.  Mill’s claim, rather, is that happiness, no matter whose happiness, 
is a good.  It is a good, not just for you, or me, or whoever—it is good in itself.  With this, 
we can set aside any concern that P4 implies that the aggregate has a good (C1).   
Assuaging concern about C2 will be more involved.  Remember, in P4, from the 
fact that my happiness is a good to me, we infer that the general happiness is a good in 
itself (this is our spin on Mill’s “good for the aggregate”).  For Mill, this is a significant 
transition:  it is a move from the first-person point of view to a more general point of 
view, a moral point of view.  In P1, we evaluate whether our own happiness is a good to 
us, and in doing so we necessarily evaluate it from the first-person point of view.  To say 
that something is a good to me involves evaluating it from my own point of view and 
determining that it is desirable, from my point of view.   
                                                 
96We will see later that this claim is equivalent to happiness being desirable from the moral point of view. 
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In contrast, evaluating whether something is good in itself, for Mill, involves 
evaluating it from a different point of view, a point of view that is unbiased and 
objective.97 This point of view could be called a general or a moral point of view.  In P1, 
I realize that my happiness is a good to me, but when I adopt a general, moral point of 
view, I come to see that there is nothing special about me that makes my happiness 
special, more important or more desirable than anyone else’s happiness.  I realize that my 
happiness is no more special or desirable than another’s happiness; I realize that each 
person’s happiness is equally desirable and important.  For Mill, this transition is what 
legitimates the move from an individual’s happiness being good for him to the aggregate 
happiness being a good in itself.98  It would not be true if said from the first-person point 
of view.  From the first-person point of view, the fact that it is my happiness is exactly 
what makes my happiness more special and more important, to me.  As we saw in the 
previous section, in fact, it is only that something is desired by me that can ever count as 
evidence that it is desirable at all.  
The fact that Mill has already addressed what reason/motivation we have to be 
moral can provide us with our first clue about how to understand Mill’s claim in P4. 
Specifically, it cannot be about why I should be moral, but rather about what morality 
requires.  For P4, what is required is not a first-person evaluation of what is desirable, but 
rather an evaluation from a distinctly moral point of view.  From the moral point of view, 
I must step outside of my own perspective, into a more general point of view, as Hume 
                                                 
97It is still a point of view, nonetheless.   
98My argument for this reading of P4 is mainly a philosophical, rather than exegetical one. The 
interpretation of P1 with which we have been working, which does find ample textual as well as 
philosophical support, suggests that "points of view" play a significant role in Mill's thought and the 
inference in P4, so interpreted, is more reasonable than other competing interpretations of the inference. 
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would say.  From this more general, moral, point of view, we see that I desire happiness, 
and you do, and we all do. But given that we are all equal and that we all have equal 
moral standing, from the moral point of view, our happiness is equally desirable99.  
 Let’s consider an analogy.  Take a city planner.  In his personal life, he has 
personal desires and personal ends.  It is in his best interest for his neighborhood to 
remain in the residential zone, because that will keep the value of his house at its current 
healthy level.  It will also keep the neighborhood relatively quiet, which will keep his life 
more peaceful and relaxing.  He has small children, and he would prefer for the 
neighborhood to avoid the extra traffic that would result from increased business in the 
area.  From his own personal point of view, therefore, it is desirable for the neighborhood 
to remain zoned residential.   
Suppose, however, that he is on a committee to evaluate re-zoning his 
neighborhood from residential to mixed residential/business.  There are clear overriding 
benefits to the city for the neighborhood to be re-zoned as a mixed zone, which will help 
draw revenue to the city and provide many services to its residents that will make the city 
a better city and a better place to live.  As a city planner, he must evaluate the zoning 
proposal form a different point of view, a more general point of view that considers the 
effect on all of the city’s residents, and not just on him.  From this more general point of 
view (the “city planner” point of view), he recognizes the desirability (to the residents of 
the city as a whole) of the adoption of the re-zoning proposal.   
                                                 
99Mill doesn’t give us much guidance here about what would prompt us to take up this moral point of view.  
However, it may just be that we take it up because we are reading ch. 4 of Utilitarianism, and so we are 
engaged in an investigation about ethics.  If we are engaged in an ethical investigation, then clearly (we 
might suppose he would think) we need to take up the moral point of view.  Another reason might be that 
we want to engage our conscience in the proper way.  Our conscience motivates us to do what it thinks is 
right; perhaps it also motivates us to verify that what it thinks is right actually is right. 
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 Similarly, from my own, personal point-of-view, I desire my own happiness.  
However, from the moral point of view (from my point of view qua member of the moral 
community), I recognize the desirability of aggregate happiness (happiness, no matter 
whose happiness it is).  Once I am in the moral point of view, I can recognize that while 
my happiness is desirable, it is not so because of anything special about me.  And seeing 
that, I also see that your happiness is desirable, and so is everyone else’s.  Once we 
recognize that we have moved from the individual, first-person point of view, into the 
moral point of view, we no longer need to worry about the difference between my 
happiness and your happiness.   
One might worry that this implies that we come to desire the aggregate happiness, 
and that this is implausible, but here we can see a key difference between the moral point 
of view for Hume and for Mill.  On Hume’s view, we adopt the general point of view, 
and proceed to feel sentiments from that point of view.  For Mill, in contrast, the tight 
connection between desire and desirability is true from the first-person point of view, but 
not necessarily from the moral point of view.  For Mill, we don't need to feel desires 
while in the moral point of view.  Rather, when we adopt the moral point of view, we 
draw conclusions that are based on everyone's desires. 
 We saw, briefly, earlier that the fact that Mill had already addressed the issue of 
moral motivation in the third chapter is a clue that in this argument, the conclusion will 
not be about what I have reason to do, but rather, what morality requires.  So while a 
trouble-maker may try to resist by saying, “I don’t desire the general happiness, and 
therefore Mill has given me no reason to maximize it,” this would be to mistake the 
112 
  
standard of conduct with the motive to act in accordance with it.100  We have already 
seen that Mill’s proof is not intended to provide us with a reason to do anything, 
including maximize happiness.  Mill does not intend his proof to move any of us to 
action, except insofar as we are already motivated to be moral.  Raphael makes this point 
by saying,   
The common interpretation takes Mill to be trying to prove, in one 
sentence, that each man ought to desire the happiness of all.  Mill would 
hardly think this could be dealt with in one sentence.  He has in fact dealt 
with it at some length in Chapter III, where he has given a genetic 
explanation of how men do or may come to adopt the universalistic 
principle.  Sympathy, fostered by social life and education, can lead us to 
share the desires of others, to desire (and so to call desirable) what others 
desire for themselves, i.e. their happiness. (350). 
We are moved to do what is right because of our conscientious feelings (and external 
sanctions like punishment), according to Mill.  On this interpretation, then, the proof is 
intended to convince us that our conscience ought to adopt the standard given by 
utilitarianism, but not to provide us with a further reason to promote the general 
happiness. 
 We now can see why C2, the other part of the objection that accuses Mill of 
succumbing to the fallacy of composition, is misguided.  The objection interprets Mill’s 
inference as moving from my happiness being a good to me to the aggregate happiness 
being a good to me (because it is a good to the aggregate).  We have seen, however, that 
this latter move is incorrect. Mill does not need to prove that the aggregate happiness is a 
good to me—only that it is a good in itself.  Once it is established that it is a good in 
itself, my conscience will take over and give me a reason to promote it: my conscience, if 
operating correctly, will make me desire its promotion. 
                                                 
100To paraphrase Mill. 
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Let us see how this interpretation, by understanding the conclusion of the 
argument being from the general point of view, can handle another objection.  Hardy 
Jones objects to Mill’s proof on the grounds that the sum of each person’s happiness is 
very different than the maximum aggregate happiness.  He writes, “The conclusion of the 
argument is that a certain collection of individual goods is desirable.  But that collection 
is not the end specified by the utilitarian principle as the ultimate end.”  Mill, he claims, 
needs to hold that the general happiness is the sum of all individual goods, and he objects, 
saying, “the crucial premise is false.  Mill’s argument does not show that the maximum 
happiness, the “second best”, is a good” (348).  In other words, in P1, Mill claims that my 
happiness is a good, and your happiness is a good, and his happiness is a good.  And 
maybe Mill has demonstrated that happiness, collectively, is a good.  However, 
aggregated happiness is a very different thing than collective happiness.  Since the thesis 
of utilitarianism is that an act is right insofar as it promotes aggregated happiness, and not 
a collection of the happiness of individuals, there is a gap between the conclusion of 
Mill’s proof and the thesis of utilitarianism.    
 However, according to my interpretation, Jones misunderstands the “crucial” 
premise.  Mill’s point is not that we sum up the value of many individual goods.  Rather, 
the point is that once we have adopted the moral point of view, we see, within Mill’s 
teleological framework, that there is no reason to keep these goods separate.  If pleasure 
is good and pain is bad, and it doesn’t matter (morally) whose pleasure and pain it is, then 
utilitarianism follows.  We may begin by realizing that my own happiness, as an 
individual, is a good.  However, Mill does not thereby believe that the ultimate (if 
unattainable) good is my happiness + your happiness + his happiness (and he doesn’t 
114 
  
merely settle for the aggregate happiness).  Rather, as we have seen, from the general 
point of view, it is irrelevant whose happiness it is.  Jones mistakenly believes that the 
utilitarian settles for second best, because he doesn’t realize that Mill’s conclusion is said 
from the moral point of view.101   
Section 4: Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to defend Mill by emphasizing the importance of 
the role that different points of view play in the proof.  I have argued that it is essential to 
Mill’s proof that P1 is said from the first-person point of view, whereas P4 is said from 
the moral point of view.  When Mill claims that the fact that I desire x implies that x is 
desirable, the implication is claimed from the first-person point of view.  That I desire 
something is evidence to me that it is desirable for me.  But when we move through the 
argument to P4, we move to a more general, moral point of view.  The move from my 
happiness being good to me to the aggregate happiness being a good to the aggregate is 
legitimated by taking up a general, moral point of view.   
 It is interesting, then, that the “standard” interpretation seems to have understood 
the proof in precisely the reverse way it is intended.  Most proofs interpret P1 as being 
said from a general point of view, and therefore interpret the standard for desirability as 
being that desire implies that something is desirable more generally.  Similarly, they 
interpret P4 as being said from a first-personal point of view, and therefore complain that 
Mill has not succeeded in demonstrating that I have reason to promote the aggregate 
                                                 
101In an earlier footnote, I alluded to this objection and claimed that Wellman is not able to use this strategy 
to escape objection. On Wellman’s interpretation, he is not able to abstract from the first-person point of 
view to the moral point of view in the same way, because the fact that my happiness is an end proves that 
my happiness is desirable as an end.  Each individual’s happiness has intrinsic value—and since these 
values can conflict, as they do in real life, Jones is right that on this view there are two different goods at 
issue, one is the good in the “proof”, and one is the good prescribed by the utilitarian view. 
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happiness.  However, paying appropriate attention to key passages, we saw that P1 is 
more plausibly interpreted as offering a first-personal standard of evidence for what is 
desirable for me.  We also saw that since Mill addressed moral motivation in chapter 3, 
this proof is more plausibly interpreted as addressing the standard of ethics, and therefore 
P4 should be interpreted as a claim about what is desirable from the moral point of view. 
Let us revisit Mill’s proof, taking stock of the key lessons we learned along the 
way.  First, we learned that P1 should be understood as a first-personal standard of 
evidence for what is desirable. Insofar as we accept Mill’s first-person standard of 
evidence, anything that I desire will be seen to be desirable (per se, at least).  We know 
that I desire my happiness, and therefore I view it as desirable to me, as a good to me.  
We then saw that, for Mill, in order to move from what is desirable to me to what is 
morally desirable, we must correspondingly move from a first-person point of view to a 
moral point of view.  From the moral point of view, I see that the fact that my happiness 
is a good to me doesn’t depend on particular features either of my happiness or of me.  
Therefore, from the moral point of view, happiness (everyone’s happiness, not just mine, 
or yours) is a good in itself.  Within a teleological framework, this means that morality 
requires that we promote the general happiness. 
 I am not a utilitarian, and I do not take myself to have established the truth of 
utilitarianism.  But within a teleological framework, granting Mill certain plausible 
premises, I have argued that Mill’s proof is considerably more plausible than it has been 
given credit for being.  
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